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This thesis conducts a cross-country empirical study in an attempt to find the 
evidence on the relationship between corporate real estate holdings and 
corporate governance as well as public governance using a large cross-
country data. According to previous research works and our observations, 
we can hypothesize that there may exist a certain degree of over-investment 
in real estate in some companies, especially in non-real estate companies, or 
in other words, higher real estate holdings may correlate with firms' weak 
governance level as well as poor public governance. A large sum of unusual 
investments in real estate holdings may trace to and originate from corporate 
decision makers' appropriating corporate resources for their personal 
benefits. Better corporate governance and higher public governance level 
reduce these actions of pursuing private benefits. There have existed some 
studies examining this relationship, but my study is expected to extend the 
previous empirical studies into a cross-country test using a very large cross-
country dataset that includes about 11300 corporations from 42 countries. 
We will take the normalized net PPE (Plant, Property and Equipment) of 
different corporations as dependent variable, and simultaneously define 
appropriate variables to measure the firm-level governance as well as 
country-level governance. According to our regression results, we have 
reason to support a negative relationship between corporate governance, 
public governance and real estate holdings. Moreover, based on these results, 
we have some reason to believe that over-investment in real estate asset may 
be coupled with poor corporate governance and public governance. Finally, 
we provide some policy suggestions that pursuing better corporate 
governance and public governance environment lowers the expected private 
benefits, causing managers to be better aligned with shareholders in their 
investment choices. 
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1. Introduction 
For a period of time since 2006, the over-investment at fever pitch, 
especially in the real estate market in the Chinese mainland, remains one of 
the most serious and pressing problems. The central government of the 
Chinese mainland introduced a series of recessionary measures aiming at 
curbing fixed assets over-investment, especially in the field of real estate 
investment. Scandals were constantly unearthed by mass media that many 
corporations, including a fair number of non-real estate corporations, 
engaged in owning real estate and even spared no expense in running up 
debts. It was often disclosed that managers of these corporations over-invest 
in real estate blindly and actually pursue their private benefits at the sacrifice 
of the interests of other shareholders, especially the retail investors', as well 
as the stock market performance of their firms. What is worse, a large 
proportion of real estate assets with the great value invested was managed 
badly or carelessly according to some researchers' findings. This is an 
observation in the real economic environment which draws my attention to 
this issue. We hypothesize that those large investments in real estate by non-
real estate corporations mainly stem from, or we can assume that it can be 
traced to, weak corporate governance in these corporations as well as weak 
public governance in the regions they represent. However, a rigorous 
empirical study is necessitated to make this hypothesis well-grounded. 
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Aside from our observations of over-investments in real estate holdings, 
some statistical results and empirical studies in this field also indicate that 
many companies engage in investing a large quantity of money in real estate 
rather than deploying them in their core business areas. Liow (2004) selected 
75 non-real estate corporations that own at least 20 percent of assets as 
properties, and compared the stock market performance of the so-called 
"composite" (with real estate) and “business’’ (without real estate) 
corporations. He found that the inclusion of real estate in a corporate 
portfolio appears to be associated with lower return, higher total risk, higher 
systematic risk and poorer abnormal return performance. It is therefore 
likely that non-real estate firms go after properties for reasons other than 
seeking improvement in their stock market performance. In Chu's thesis he 
provided the result of Liow K. H. (1995) that quite a few non-real estate 
corporations in the United Kingdom control so many real estate portfolios 
that are comparable to those owned by property corporations whose core 
business focuses on real estate. 
Combining our observations on over-investing in real estate and academic 
reports which examine the over-investment behavior and limited stock 
market improvement resulting from these investments, we would like to dig 
into this problem and expect to construct an appropriate model to describe 
this over-investment phenomenon, or introduce a reasonable hypothesis 
tracking down to the root of over-investment by those non-real estate 
corporations and then conduct an empirical analysis to examine it. This is 
just the germ of the idea of this study. 
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Now that we have known that many non-real estate corporations engage in 
investing in a large amount of real estate holdings, and far more important, 
though, is that these real estate assets are ill-managed or under-managed in 
accordance with some previous empirical works. How to address those 
managers' real purposes of over-investing in real estate? To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no theoretical work focusing on constructing a good 
mathematical model to interpret this matter. Therefore, we divert to 
introduce a reasonable explanation of over-investing in many non-real estate 
companies. Based on this, we conduct regression works to examine the 
hypothesized relationship between investments in real estate and factors that 
restrain those managers' investment decisions. 
Firstly, we should find a solid theoretical and empirical support to our 
hypothesis. Sometimes the interests and incentives of managers and 
shareholders conflict over issues such as the payment of cash to shareholders. 
This kind of conflict occurs more often in those firms with a lot of free cash 
flows. Free cash flows foster the corporation managements' incentives to use 
the cash in inefficient ways and even pursue their private benefits at the 
sacrifice of other shareholders' benefits as well as the firms' performance. 
This conclusion has been examined and eventually supported by many 
research works. On the other hand, by our common sense, some managers 
like to "keep up appearances" and tickle their vanity by building many grand 
office buildings that their needs cannot justify, in the name of "improving 
the company's image". Besides, some managers of big enterprises devote to 
sensual pleasures that often entail excess office buildings or luxurious 
apartments. Moreover, over-investment makes investors' benefits at 
discretion of management, which means that these managers seek huge 
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profits without bearing any responsibility for the risk of asset depreciation. 
For these reasons, we can naturally propose a hypothesis that the 
management grabs higher private benefit by means of over-investing in real 
estate assets, especially in the corporations which are left with free cash 
flows in larger quantities. 
Clearly, there is a close relationship between managers' over-investment 
decisions in non-real estate corporations and corporate governance level in 
these companies. Further, at the country level, over-investing is also 
conditioned by public governance level, or in other words, it is restricted by 
the investor protection in each country. According to La Porta et al (1998) 
and other relevant literatures, the measure of country-level governance 
mainly focuses on the quality of accounting standards or disclosure, rule of 
law, and anti-director rights. Apparently it is rather more difficult for 
management to expropriate corporate earnings for their private benefits in a 
corporation with a higher governance level, or the company that registers 
and operates in a country with comparatively strong legal institutions. At 
this point, we can hypothesize that there may exist a certain statistical 
correlation between the scale of firm-level investments in real estate assets 
and corporate governance as well as public governance. We began with an 
empirical study in which we attempt to find the evidence for the relationship 
between corporate real estate holdings and corporate governance as well as 
public governance level using large cross-country data. More concretely, we 
choose public governance indexes given in La Porta et al (1998) 
(Accounting Standard or Disclosure, Rule of Law, Anti-director Rights, 
Corruption, and Risk of Expropriation) and the other six indexes provided 
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by the annual reports of the Economic Freedom of the World to conduct our 
regression work. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II presents a literature 
review or a discussion of the different arguments that link corporate 
governance, public governance to firms' real estate holdings. We lay out the 
corporate governance measures in Section III and public governance 
measures in Section IV. Section V summarizes the determinants of real 
estate holdings. Section VI is data summary and empirical methodology. 
Section VII presents statistical figures and regression results. Section VIII is 
robustness check and Section IX concludes the whole paper\ 
1 Regression results are shown in the Tables and Appendices. 
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2. Literature Review and Some Discussions 
Before we take the next step, it will certainly be beneficial to review the 
relevant research results in this area. The first one is Coles et al (2006) in 
which they provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between 
the structure of managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, 
and firm risk. Particularly, their work highlights the influence of managerial 
incentives on investment decisions. They find that CEOs with a higher 
sensitivity of their wealth to stock volatility implements riskier policy 
choices, including relatively more investment in R&D，less investment in 
property, plant and equipment, more focus on fewer lines of business, and 
higher leverage. In fact, I find my own study closely related with theirs in 
the respects of both logic and methodology. They apply the concept of 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility to measure the managerial 
incentive mechanism in a corporation to conduct the empirical work. 
However, virtually, the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility, or the 
percentage of a manager's compensation that is equity-based ,^ surely can be 
treated as one aspect of corporate governance. In fact, Chu has already 
deemed "CEO Compensation" variable as one of the explanatory variables 
which are applied to measure corporate governance in his empirical study. 
Coles et al. (2006) serves as an example as well as a very good ground for 
the later studies in this topic. 
Chu used US data to test the hypothesis that there is negative relationship 
2 See Jensen and Murphy (1990a) 
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between corporate governance and real estate holdings. The author applied 
Management Ownership, Outside Blockholder Ownership, Executive 
Compensation Structure, Board Composition, and Duality as measures of 
corporate governance strength which mainly focus on the following two 
aspects: the first is separation of ownership and control right, and the other is 
agency issue, which chiefly means CEO compensation structure and duality 
issue. He noted that weaker corporate governance is negatively associated 
with higher over-investment in the real estate holding at the firm-level. 
Apparently, to the best of my knowledge, all the previous empirical works 
studying the relationship between real estate holdings and governance 
concentrate on a single country analyses, generally applying US datasets to 
conduct the cross-sectional regression. Besides, these works pay more 
attention to firm-level corporate governance while the country-level public 
governance has been almost totally neglected in the previous research. 
Sometimes public governance, which actually reflects the macroeconomic 
condition and legislative environment of a certain country or region, plays a 
more visible role in improving the investor protection and restricting 
managers' over-investment decisions aiming at pursuing private benefits or 
satisfying personal desires. So it is essential to include public governance 
measures in our dataset to weigh its influence on and its relationship with 
real estate investment especially when conducting a cross-country empirical 
study. 
Kose John et al (2005) find strong empirical confirmation of a positive 
relationship between investor protection and investment risk using a cross-
country panel. For measuring the degree of investor protection at country-
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level they supplemented three measures of investor protection which is 
Q 
retrieved from La Porta et al. (1998) to conduct a country-level regression 
using a larger cross-country dataset, not just firm-level regression work as 
other scholars have done. We hope to benefit from their experience. 
A central theme of corporate governance is how constraints on managers' 
pursuit of private benefits at the expenses of shareholders lead to 
improvement of corporate performance. In other words, it is a principal-
agent problem. However, a corporation may face different principal-agent 
problem according to the characteristic of its ownership structure. On the 
one hand, for a corporation with quite dispersed ownership structure, the 
agency problem manifests itself mainly in the conflict of interests between 
the largest shareholders and managers. On the other hand, if ownership 
concentration is very high, the agency problem is mainly shown in the 
conflict of interests between the largest controlling shareholder and other 
minority shareholders. However, in fact, our concern lies in whether the 
above two types of agency problems exert direct or indirect influence upon 
managers' investment decisions in real estate assets. 
The earliest pioneering literature in the field of ownership structure can be 
credited to Berle & Means (1932), in which they provide a ground for a 
negative relationship between the diffuseness of corporate ownership 
structure and corporate performance. Hereafter, the relationship between 
corporate performance and ownership structure evolved into a most 
important issue in Corporate Finance and the effect of ownership structures 
on the value of firms has been investigated extensively. The kernel of the 
3 For the index details, refer to La Porta et al. (1998) and Kose John et al. (2005) 
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problem includes the attribute of ownership structure (exogenous or 
endogenous), measuring corporate performance (for instance, Tobin's Q and 
ROE), and the relationship between firm performance and its ownership 
structure. Jensen & Meckling (1976) distinguished inside "owner-manager" 
from outside shareholders without voting rights and shows that shareholders 
with large ownership stakes have strong incentives to maximize their firms' 
value and are able to collect information and oversee managers, thereby 
helping overcome one of the principal-agent problems in the modem 
corporation~that of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. 
However, some other economists, such as Demsetz"^ , argued for the 
nonexistence of systematic correlation between ownership structure and 
variation of corporate performance. Majority of US empirical studies 
support the view point of Demsetz. On the contrary, Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) was largely verified by the researches focusing on the listed firms out 
of US. Empirically, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find an inverse U-
shaped relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm valuation 
for a sample of U.S. firms. One interpretation is that firms' performance 
improves with higher managerial ownership, but that, after a point, managers 
become entrenched and pursue private benefits at the expense of outside 
investors. No matter what sort of effect (incentive or entrenchment) works, 
we apply Herfindahl Index, the largest shareholder's ownership and other 
indexes to measure the degree of ownership concentration, and try to 
examine the hypothesized relationship between ownership concentration and 
over-investment behavior in a cross-country context. In addition, we include 
a dummy variable "Management" along with other variables related to 
4 For the details, refer to Demsetz (1983). Demsetz & Lehn (1985) also find no effect of concentration on 
accounting profits. 
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measuring agency cost between the largest shareholders and managers to 
examine the existence of their correlations with real estate holdings. 
Claessens et al. (2002) shows that, for the largest shareholders, the 
discrepancy between control rights and cash-flow rights is associated with a 
value discount and that the discount generally increases with the size of the 
wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights. Further, some 
economists suggested that the separation of ownership and control accounts 
for the problem that managers waste corporate resources and cash flow on 
excess perquisites and negative net present value assets at expenses of 
shareholders .^ Considering the importance of separation of the two rights, 
we meanwhile employ the ratio of cash flow rights to control rights as one of 
explanatory variables for our empirical test. 
Claessens et al (2002) and Faccio, M. & L. Lang (2002) took hard statistical 
works aiming at analyzing the ultimate ownership and control of more than 
6,500 corporations in eight East Asian economies and 13 Western European 
countries in total. Their monumental contributions make it possible to obtain 
reliable firsthand ownership structure data in these countries. It 
unquestionably facilitates our data collection work and cross-country study. 
We match corporate governance data (given by Claessens et al (2002) and 
Faccio & L. Lang (2002)), public governance data (following La Porta et al 
(1998) and several firm-level control variables to conduct both firm-level 
regressions and country-level empirical works to seek the evidence for the 
relationship between these variables and corporate real estate investment. 
5 The earliest paper focusing on separation of the two rights is Jensen & Mecking (1976). Some other 
economists try to find statistical and empirical supports soon after such as La Porta et al (2000) 
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3. Measuring Corporate Governance 
3.1. Overview 
In my own words, corporate governance is actually a whole set of system 
mechanism designed for balancing or coordinating diversified interests and 
relationships of corporate investors (including shareholders and creditors), 
management layer, and the staff and meanwhile promoting profit-
maximizing and performance-enhanced activities from this form of system. 
As discussed in the part of Introduction, a central theme of corporate 
governance is largely attributed to the principal-agent problem after Jensen 
& Meckling (1976). Agency theory has also brought the roles of managerial 
decision rights and various external and internal monitoring and bonding 
mechanisms to the forefront of theoretical discussions and empirical 
research. Empirically, agency cost has been applied broadly in explaining 
the choices of capital structure, maturity structure, dividend policy, and 
executive compensation. 
However, most previous researches have focused their efforts on the agent 
relationship between shareholders and managers in large publicly traded 
corporations with diffused ownership within the framework of the 
conventional US/UK model of corporate control. Little is known about the 
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corporate governance implications of concentrated ownerships. In fact, 
ownership structure is the primary determinant of agency cost. According to 
La Porta et al” (2000a) and Shleifer and Vishny, (1997), the primary agency 
problem in corporations with highly concentrated ownership structure is not 
the failure of professional managers to satisfy the objectives of diffused 
shareholders, but rather the expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
large-block shareholders. In my opinion, to widen our overviews of the 
agency problem, we can say that there are actually several dissimilar but 
mutually correlated agency problems existing in modem corporations. 
Corporations may encounter different principal-agency problems, depending 
upon their respective characteristics of ownership structure. On the one hand, 
for a corporation with quite dispersed ownership structure, the agent 
problem manifests itself mainly in the conflict of interests between largest 
shareholders and managers. On the other hand, if ownership concentration is 
so high that the controlling shareholder alone exists in the corporation the 
agency problem is shown in the conflict of interests between the largest 
controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Please note that the meaning 
of principal-agent problems, which is partly borrowed, is not in complete 
agreement with the definition in Jensen & Meckling (1976). This kind of 
‘derivative，agency problem can be called Central Agency Problem. 
Furthermore, it may be essential to do a brief review here in order to clarify 
our logic in intricate aspects of problems concerning the structure of 
corporate governance. We believe that modem corporate governance 
structure encompasses connotations in at least the following seven areas: 
6 Refer to Holdemess & Sheehan 1988 
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Firstly, a highly effective and efficient corporate governance system should 
be the basis for a well-defined ownership structure. Secondly, ownership can 
be moderately concentrated on the premise of a certain level of diversity of 
ownership structure. Thirdly, an optimal governance system allocation is 
supposed to guarantee the shareholders' authority to hire, fire, and supervise 
managers. Fourthly, largest shareholders' cash flow rights should be 
commensurate with their control rights as much as possible. Minor 
discrepancy between cash flow rights and control rights can supposedly and 
efficaciously ward off wastes of resources and cash flows for private 
interests. Fifthly, linking managers' compensation to firm performance 
motivates them to make more value-maximizing decisions. For example, one 
specific way to secure this close link is to make a greater percentage of a 
manager's compensation equity-based. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) 
suggested that equity-based rather than cash compensation improve 
managers' performances. Some studies subsequently find statistical evidence 
on this relationship. Of course, there are still some studies indicating that 
higher pay-performance sensitivity leads to less risky investment decisions 
due to higher dependence of managers' remunerations on firms' investments 
and performances. Sixthly, give more decision-making power to the 
manager layer under a pellucid and transparent ownership structure. 
Seventhly, a flexibility of implementing different control rights in terms of 
volatile corporate performance is advantageous to the firm. Generally 
speaking, more control rights rest with largest shareholders when 
corporation performance is in excellent condition because controlling 
shareholders usually show more mercy to managers than creditors. Then, 
control rights should incline towards creditors more during depression 
periods. 
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Based on the above recognition and understanding from all angles of factors 
which influence the principal-agent problem and corporate governance 
environment, we elaborately select several indexes or ratios to measure 
corporate governance as follows: 
3.2. Ownership Concentration 
3.2.1. Overview 
As we have discussed above, the consideration of ownership concentration is 
particularly important for countries with relatively low protection of 
minority investors and for those firms where expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholders is extensive. This expropriation 
may take a variety of forms of so-called ‘tunneling，of assets and revenue 
from firms?. So the primary agency problem in such a firm is not the agency 
issue between principals and managers, but the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the large-block shareholders. This 'tunneling' behavior 
would deter outside investment and impair the firm's value. And meanwhile 
they may abuse their position of dominant control at the expense of other 
shareholders ,^ instead of imposing an effective supervision and control on 
management discretion. Over-investing is actually a sort of 'tunneling' 
behavior. Some researchers, however, have indicated that concentrated 
shareholding may create entrenchment effects in addition to incentives 
effects. Some scholars reveal that an inverted U-shape relationship exists 
between ownership concentration and earnings management practices. 
7 See La Porta etal.(1998) 
®Bebchuk(1994) 
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We put two hypotheses regarding the relationship between ownership 
structure and real estate holding. The first relates to the negative effect of 
ownership concentration on the agency problem. Building on research by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), we argue that increased shareholding by 
controlling owners make those insiders entrenched from outside monitoring. 
It will result in higher over-investment. Our second hypothesis is based on 
the theory that ownership concentration also reduces agency costs, by 
aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of the company. 
Gomes (2000) suggests that high ownership concentration is a signal of the 
controlling owner's commitment to build a reputation for not expropriating 
minority shareholders. Therefore, higher concentration degree may lead to 
lower real estate holding in non-real estate corporations. 
No matter how ownership concentration affects shareholders' behavior we 
include measures of ownership concentration in our objective function. 
3.2.2. Herfmdahl Index 
Under the guidance of previous studies we firstly employ the Herfindahl 
Index of concentration to measure the degree of concentration of ownership 
structure. To the best of my knowledge, this proxy was primarily adopted in 
Pham et al (2003). This measure is defined as the sum of the squared 
holding proportion of n largest shareholders, i.e.: 
HERFINDAHL = ^ pf ， 
j=i 
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where p, is the holding proportion of the f largest shareholder. 
Generally speaking, scholars tend to choose the largest five shareholders to 
calculate the index. We also follow this measure. So the calculation 
formulation of Herfindahl Index in this study is as follows: 
5 
HERFINDAHL,,,=工 pf (*) 
i=i 
However, we have also discovered that some scholars obtain better modified 
HERFINDAHL by including more shareholders' holdings in the formulation, 
or separate their data into several groups to obtain a summation value of 
squared holding levels of n largest groups of shareholders if it is available. 
However, restricted by our data resources, we still apply formulation (*). 
3.2.3. Controlling Largest Shareholder's Ownership 
Although Herfindahl Index has been widely applied in measuring 
concentration, we should pay attention to this problem: if there is one large 
owner with dominant control of the firm, then measuring only this owner's 
holdings, instead of the joint holdings of the top five or more owners, seems 
to be more appropriate. Nevertheless, if multiple medium-size owners are in 
fact able to form effective coalitions, then the group measure, i.e., 
Herfindahl Index may be more useful. The lack of attention to implications 
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of different measurements may contribute to conflicting empirical results of 
previous works. Taking this problem into account, we also apply so-called 
the controlling largest shareholder's holding to measure concentration. For 
the sake of simplicity, we separately exploit the top largest shareholder's 
holding (at 20% cutoff) to test its correlation with PPE level. We should 
avoid multicollinearity. 
3.3. Check-and-balance of Ownership 
3.3.1. Overview 
Up to now, our selection of governance measurement has spontaneously 
followed the 'modem' theory of corporate governance, which focuses more 
on the governance level of corporations with relatively concentrated 
ownership structure, for example, closely held corporations, which are the 
dominant form of ownership in developing and transitional economics. In 
these firms, there are some shareholders who are large enough not to 
surrender control to the manager even though none of the shareholders are 
able to control the firm alone. In those corporations investment decisions are 
eventually a result of the convergence of interactions among the several 
large shareholders. Some studies research on the coalition behavior and 
control contest among several largest shareholders .^ Both positive and 
negative relationships between the cash flow stake of the controlling 
9 See Bennedsen & Wolfenzon (2001) 
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coalition and firm value has been obtained. All in all, we expect to include 
some indexes measuring the ‘check-and-balance, effect between the largest 
shareholders to look into the effect of this balance strength on real estate 
investing decisions. 
3.3.2. Balance Index 
Some scholars use the ratio of the second largest shareholder's holdings to 
the largest shareholder's to serve as a measure of balance strength. But we 
have reason to believe that the correlation between investment scale, 
concentration, and balance strength is non-linear. So we follow another 
alternative method which measures “balance effect" by the gap between 
squared value of the largest shareholder's holding and the sum of the square 
value of other largest shareholders. The "Balance Index" data in the later 
regression work is calculated as follows: 
5 
2 V"* 2 
Balance Index = P\ ~ Zu Pi ， 
i=2 
where p, is the proportion of holdings of the n largest shareholders. 
3.4. Controlling owner alone 
Controlling owner alone represents an extreme case of highly concentrated 
ownership structure. A controlling shareholder is said to be “alone” if no 
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other owner controls at least 10% (or 20%) of the voting rights. Faccio & 
Lang (2002) ’s dataset includes information of the alone controlling 
shareholder in a corporation in Europe. 
3.5. Separation of Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that the separation of ownership and 
control gives managers the chance to waste corporate resources and cash 
flow on excess perquisites and negative net present value projects at the 
expenses of shareholders. Therefore, separation of ownership and control is 
at the root of the problem. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(LLSV, 1999) formally measured ownership by cash flow rights, and 
measure control by voting rights obtained by direct and indirect holdings. 
Consequently, excess control occurs and separation of the two rights 
becomes an excellent explanation and measure of corporate governance. 
This view is largely verified by many recent empirical studiesBuilding on 
the foundation of previous research we can hypothesize that there may exist 
negative relationship between separation of cash flow rights and control 
rights and over-investing decisions. Claessens et al (2002) and Faccio et al 
Refer to La Porta et al (2000) and Brav et al. (2003) 
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(2002) provide values of separation of the two rights which can be matched 
with other control variables to conduct cross-sectional regression works. We 
will check whether the real estate holding will be affected by the separation 
of firms' shareholders' ultimate cash flow rights and their voting rights, i.e., 
control rights. We directly apply corresponding datasets in the above two 
papers to test our hypotheses. 
3.6. Principal-Agent Problem between the largest 
shareholders and managers 
3.6.1. Duality 
Up to now, we measure corporate governance based on ownership 
characteristics and separation of ownership and control, that is to say, focus 
on Central Agency Problem which represents the relationship and balance 
between minority shareholders and the largest blockholders or the largest 
shareholder and other largest ones. Nonetheless, we should not ignore the 
principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. To reduce the 
agency cost in this layer, firstly, CEO should not have a dual position as 
chairman or vice-chairman of the board because the CEO may not separate 
personal interests from shareholder interests. Moreover, we should also pay 
attention to this phenomenon that manager comes from a member of 
controlling family. In the datasets of Claessens et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. 
(2002)，“Management” and “Man” serve as dummy variables which are 
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equal to 1 if the manager is also the Chairman or Vice-chairman of the board. 
We apply them to measure the duality problem and hope to see whether the 
duality problem will influence firms' real estate investment decisions. 
3.6.2. Managerial Ownership 
Secondly, we believe that Managerial Ownership directly influences 
management performance. More evidences indicate that tightly linking 
managers' compensation to firm performance motivates them to make more 
value-maximizing decisions. Mehran (1995) discovered a significant 
positive relationship between the percentage of shares held by the CEO and 
firm performance. Singh and Davidson (2003) discovered that firms with 
significant insider ownership are more efficient in their asset utilization and 
have lower managerial discretionary expenditure relative to firms with 
below-median inside ownership. Mcconnel and Servaes (1990) found that 
the relations between Tobin's Q and insider ownership slopes upward. We 
also prepare to include managerial compensation data in our regression. 
Thus we have reasons to expect a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and real estate holdings. 
3.7. Board Composition 
An enlarging body of empirical findings generally supports the argument 
that outside directors are important and effective for monitoring 
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management and thus reducing agency cost. Jensen (1993) argued that 
outside directors have an incentive to act as effective monitors of 
management because they want to protect their reputations as independent 
and effective decision makers. What's more, Weisbach (1988) found that 
firms' performance is highly related with CEO turnover for firms in which 
outsiders dominate the boards of director than for firms in which insiders 
dominate. Weisbach's results support the idea that top management turnover 
is more effectively linked with market-related performance when outsiders 
dominate the board of directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) studied 
outside director announcements and found that appointments of outside 
directors in general increase firm value. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) 
presented empirical evidence which suggests that outside directors represent 
shareholder interests better than inside directors. By focusing on Chinese 
firms, Chen et al (2006) showed that the proportion of outside directors is 
associated with incidence of fraud. In the context of these papers, one would 
expect that the board structure of companies exerts some influence on their 
real estate holding. In particular, we will test whether the real estate holding 
will be affected by the corporate board composition, which is measured by 
the ratio of the number of outsiders in the board of directors (neither current 
nor past officer) relative to the total number of directors. 
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4. Measuring Public Governance 
Our cross-country dataset in fact can be divided into two parts, one of which 
contains 22 countries, including 13 Western European countries in Claessens 
et al. (2002) and 9 East Asian countries once analyzed by Faccio & Lang 
(2002). Matching corporate governance data with data of firm-level control 
variables provided by Worldscope (specifically from Worldscope 1997-
2000)，firstly we can conduct firm-level regression analysis in each country 
as well as the full sample to examine the hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and real estate holding and draw 
a parallel between different countries and regions. Next, we import some 
country-level governance variables into a larger integrated dataset, which 
consists of more than 40 countries from different continents included in 
Worldscope, and test our hypothesized relationship between public 
governance level and over-investment in real estate assets. Besides, we hope 
to do some comparisons of the complementarity effects as well as 
substitution effects between corporate governance and public governance 
using this big panel. This is just our whole plan of empirical works. 
To character public governance level in each country, we use ten measures 
provided by La Porta et al. (1998) and the annual reports of the Economic 
Freedom of the World^^ Law and Order (or Rule of Law), Legal System, 
Anti-director Rights, Corruption, Risk of Expropriation, Size of Government, 
Regulation, Starting a New Business, Time with Government Bureaucracy, 
“The relevant website is www.freetheworld.coni. the annual reports of each year can be downloaded there. 
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in which Rule of Law (RL), Accounting Standards or Disclosure (ASR), 
Anti-director Rights (ADR), Corruption, Risk of Expropriation are retrieved 
from La Porta et al (1998) who tabulate the original data from the Center 
for International Financial Analysis and Research, and other measures such 
as Law and Order, Legal System, Size of Government, Regulation, Starting 
a new business, and Time with Government Bureaucracy are retrieved from 
1997 Annual Report of Economic Freedom of the World. Table 1 spells out 
the index details. 
Higher accounting standards may lead to lower usual investment in real 
estate, especially for managers' personal benefits, because they make the 
diversion of corporate resources more difficult. It can effectively lessen the 
propensity to tunnel. We also employ the Law and Order (or Rule of Law 
(RL)) and Regulation as indicators of effectiveness of enforcement of the 
law as well as regulations made by the governments. The lower scores 
indicate less tradition for law and order. Besides, we include the Anti-
director Rights index (also from La Porta (1998)) to gauge the level of 
protection of minority shareholders from insider stealing. Corruption is 
ICRG12，s assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate 
that "higher government officials are likely to demand special payments" 
and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans." 
Corruption index ranges from zero to 10，with lower scores for higher levels 
of corruption. More serious corruption may indulge some managers' 
‘tunneling’ behavior and bribe because they may grease the palm of 
12 International Country Risk Guide: www.countrvrisk.com. 
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government officials by over-investing in real estate and give presents to 
them in order to pursue their individual benefits at the cost of shareholders' 
benefits and firms' development. Risk of Expropriation is ICRG's 
assessment of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization. It 
scales from zero to 10，with lower scores for higher risks. We have reason to 
believe that there may exists a certain negative relationship between a higher 
index of Risk of Expropriation and a lower investment in real estate because 
higher risk of expropriation may increase the cost of over-investment and 
'tunneling' actions. In addition, we added some measures concerning 
government scale and government efficiency to be kinds of gauges of public 
governance to test their correlations with firms' real estate holdings. For 
instance, we expect that the index of Starting a New Business is positively 
related with real estate holdings since a higher index indicates the larger 
amount of time needed to spend in the process of approval of a new business 
in the relevant government departments. Managers perhaps abandon or delay 
a plan of real estate investment due to ineffective and powerless government 
officials. 
Here please note that the measure of Rule of Law in La Porta et al (1998) 
and the other measure of Law and Order in the 1997 Annual Report of 
Economic Freedom of the World may be similarly defined and highly 
correlated. Thus, we should avoid simultaneously including them in one 
objective function when conducting our regression work. In Table 7 (1) and 
Table 7 (2) we report regression results of Panel Al of 13 Western European 
countries. However, in the Table 7 (1) we use three measures: ASR, RL, and 
ADR retrieved from La Porta et al (1998) to test the relationship between 
public governance and real estate holdings. But in the Table 7 (2), we report 
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the regression results when employing all the ten measures and substituting 
Law and Order for Rule of Law. 
Here please note that the institutional measures in Law and Finance are 
mainly dated in mid nineties and our data sample is from 1996 to 2002. A 
few measures left are retrieved from the 1997 Annual Reports of Economic 
Freedom of the World. In spite of these time gap, we still apply those 
measures without much anxiety because we have reason to believe that 
public governance levels and institutional regimes tend not to change rapidly. 
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5. Determinants of Real Estate Holdings 
There are various factors affecting a firm's over-investing decisions, and 
sometimes they are probably stochastic and ambiguous. According to the 
regression results of Chu (2006) LT DEBT (Long Term Debt), M/B, Free 
Cash Flow, and Business Segments are related to real estate holdings and 
they indicate certain statistical significance. Following control variables and 
the average significance levels in practice in the field of empirical studies of 
corporate governance, we will primarily select level of debt (LT Debt), 
growth opportunities (M/B), size (Ln Sales), a firm's degree of 
diversification (Business Segments), dividend payment (No Dividend) as 
control variables in our analysis. 
Firstly, we hypothesize that firms with better growth opportunities would 
prefer to rent instead of holding real estate assets in their total asset portfolio. 
We employ Market to Book value as a proxy for firms' growth opportunity 
and assume that a higher M/B ratio indicative of better growth opportunities. 
Secondly, it has been suggested by some scholars that debt can force 
managers to generate cash more effectively in order to meet interest and 
principal obligations. Some researchers find that real estate holding is 
always positively associated with long term debt^ .^ In Chu's study on US 
data, the significance of estimates of level of debt tends to be almost always 
very high. We employ long term debt to total asset as a measure of level of 
debt as a control. Thirdly, we should take size effect on real estate holding 
13 Redman and Tanner(1991) and Liow (1995) 
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into account. Intuitionally, smaller firms may not need an entire unit of 
building, but on the contrary, larger firms are more likely to have alternative 
uses for equipment and have better mechanism to remarket it when 
necessary. However, empirically, the findings of influence of firm size on 
owning real estate assets are changing and different. So we just include size 
as a proxy, which is measured by the natural log of sales, to test its influence 
on real estate holding in our dataset. Besides, we also employ other proxies 
such as a firm's degree of diversification (Business Segments), dividend 
payment, and industry effect to be control variables. Of course, inclusion of 
certain variables will surely be conditioned by availability of data resources 
sometimes in some particular analyses. 
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6. Data and Empirical Methodology 
6.1. Data Summary 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables at the country 
level. The sample is chosen based on the requirement that data are available 
to obtain meanwhile in the Worldscope, Claessens et al. (2002) and Faccio 
& Lang (2002)，and La Porta et al. (1998). Our starting point for the data is 
from three datasets: we collect the data of firm-level control variables from 
Worldscope1995, Worldscope 1996, to Worldscope1998. Primarily, we 
collect the Net PPE data and normalize it by firm scale (total asset) in 1998. 
For a minority of control variables in some country (such as Board 
Composition, Managerial Ownership) we need to collect them from 
Datastream and match them with the companies in the Worldscope in every 
year. Next, we collect the data regarding ownership structure in Western 
European countries and East Asian countries from Claessens et al. (2002) 
and Faccio & Lang (2002), in which 2980 corporations from East Asia and 
5232 firms from West Europe are included. In fact, the work to follow is the 
hardest one: to match the corporate governance data, public governance data 
with the data of firm characteristics variables in Worlscope. The matching 
was based on the corporations embodied in Worldscope. Using Worldscope 
95, 96 and 97 we obtain all of the average and normalized data of every 
control variables. 
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First, we must exclude real estate development firms as well as financial 
institutions since our objective is to analyze the PPE owned by non-real 
estate and non-financial corporations. Then, firms with missing observations 
of any variable were dropped. After matching the data of control variables, 
firm-level governance data, and public governance data, we will be left with 
a large cross-country dataset having 42 countries. After full sample splitting, 
we obtain two cross-country datasets: Panel A and Panel B. Panel A contains 
22 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (South), Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, including 13 Western European countries embodied in 
Faccio & L. Lang (2002) and 9 East Asian countries included in Claessens et 
al. (2002)14. Matching the data of corporate governance variables and ten 
public governance variables with those of firm-level control variables 
provided by Worldscope (specifically from Worldscope 1997-2000) in these 
22 countries, we obtained Panel A. And then we conduct firm-level 
regression works in each country as well as the full sample to examine the 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate governance, public 
governance and real estate holdings. Next, we added the other 20 countries 
into Panel A to obtain a larger integrated dataset Panel B, which totally 
consists of 42 countries from different continents included in the 
Worldscope, and test our hypothesized relationship between public 
governance level and investment in real estate assets. Table 2 presents all the 
countries included in Panel B. Here please note that no corporate governance 
variable is included in the Panel B since we can not obtain an authorized 
dataset of corporate governance of 20 countries added later. For Panel B, we 
14 Japan is excluded when they conduct the empirical test. 
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only test the hypothesized relationship between public governance and 
firms' real estate holdings. Finally, we hope to do some comparisons of the 
complementarity effects as well as substitution effects between corporate 
governance and public governance using this big panel. This is just our 
whole plan of empirical works. In addition, we also look forward to 
comparing the differences of ownership structures and influence of 
governance mechanism on real estate holding between Anglo-American 
Law System, which is named as ''arm's-length'' type in corporate 
governance, and Continental Law System that is “control-oriented”. 
6.2. Empirical Examination 
We intend to examine if there is any negative relationship between corporate 
real estate holding and corporate governance strength (such as ownership 
structure, Herfindahl Index, Balance Index, separation of cash flow rights 
and control, duality, Managerial Ownership and so on). We estimate cross-
sectional econometrics model using the average value of the firm 
characteristics over 3 years, corporate governance measures, and public 
governance levels. Specifically, our empirical work is organized as follows: 
(1) Regressing firm-level real estate holdings on firm-level corporate 
governance and country-level public governance using Panel A 
data. 
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We firstly examine the hypothesized relationship between real estate 
holdings, corporate governance and public governance level using Panel A 
data of 22 countries in the period of 1995-1998. A cross-country study is 
appropriate because variation in restraint and supervision over the over-
investment behavior across countries is more likely to be exogenous than 
variations within countries. The empirical work entails regressing real estate 
holdings on corporate governance as well as country-level governance, 
controlling for other relevant factors. We choose 13 Western European 
countries elected by Faccio & Lang (2002) and 9 Eastern Asian countries 
(including Japan) chosen by Claessens et al (2002). The regression 
specification is as follows: 
PPE / TAj = + (XiCorporateGovernancej^ + a^PublicGovernance^ + a^X CO, 
where X is the vector of control variables regarding firm characteristics. The 
inferior character f and c represent firm-level measures and country-level 
indexes respectively. A series of regression results would be reported in 
Table 5 (I) and Table 5 (II). 
(2) Regressing real estate holdings on country-level public governance 
using Panel B data. 
As we have discussed above, Panel B contains real estate holdings data (the 
dependent variable) in 1998, the explanatory variables over the period of 
1995-1997, and country-level public governance variables of 42 countries 
from five different continents. There are empirical studies suggesting that 
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corporate governance-related variables as well as public governance-related 
variables are rather stable over a certain period of time. Therefore, there is 
no need for us to worry about that measuring corporate governance and 
public governance characteristics in a single year would generate a bias in 
our results. Specifically, our objective function at this step is as follows: 
P PE I TA ^ = a^ + a^Pub lie Gove rnance^ + a^X + e， 
where X is also the vector of firm characteristics variables. The inferior 
character f and c representing firm-level measures and country-level indexes 
respectively. 
Up to now, we have been choosing PPE/TA value in 1998 as our dependent 
variable at every step. However, in order to eliminate the stochastic nature of 
our choice, we use the average value of PPE/TA from 1995 to 1998 to repeat 
the same analysis and compare the results with previous analysis. Please 
refer to Table 9 for comparison. 
(3) Study the "Interaction Effect” between corporate governance and 
public governance strength. 
Next, we are concerned about an interesting problem that whether there 
exists an "Interaction Effect" between firm-level corporate governance and 
public governance of the country in which the firm resides. In general, there 
33 
may exist three possible consequences: no significant relationship between 
the two sides, “substitution effect，，(lower public governance promote 
improvement in corporate governance), and ‘‘complementarity effect，，(lower 
public governance is associated with lower corporate governance level. For 
measuring "Interaction Effect", we adopt two methods which have been 
chosen and suggested in the previous literatures. For the first way, we can 
directly multiply a corporate governance variable with the corresponding 
public governance variable to obtain a new variable^ ,^ and then we regress 
firm-level PPE/TA on this new variable as well as the other original 
variables to see whether this new "interaction" variable exerts significantly 
positive/negative impact on the dependent variable. However, if the pair of 
corporate governance variable and public governance variable that we have 
chosen varies in the different direction, we need to adopt another way to test 
the "Interaction Effect". The steps of this way are as follows: Firstly, we 
choose one of the public governance indexes and calculate out its median 
value across 42 countries, and then we define a new dummy variable 
“Interaction Effect" that takes a value of one if the public governance index 
of this country is lower than the median value, and it will take 0 if the public 
index of this country is larger than the median value. Secondly, we multiply 
the public governance variable with the corresponding corporate governance 
variable to obtain a new variable. Thirdly, we regress the dependent variable 
on this new variable with other control variables. We can use the Panel A 
dataset to realize this study plan. 
15 when we use the first method, it should be satisfactory that each pair of corporate governance variable 
and public governance variable that are chosen to check the interaction effect should vary at the same 
direction. Otherwise, we will use the second way to analyze this effect. 
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(4) Present all of the statistical summaries and regression results of the 
main countries. 
Except for the results of the full sample, we report the regression results for 
those large countries or regions. For details, please refer to Appendix Tables. 
Especially, we report all of the regression results of U.K., France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Japan, and other great nations in Appendix 1. 
Besides, we give our careful attention to the problem of reverse causality 
when we conduct our regression work. We have noticed that the governance 
variables could be endogenous. There could be reverse causality: more real 
estate holdings could allow management or controlling shareholder to have 
more chances or ways to misuse physical capital to satisfy their demand for 
private benefits. There could be latent variable bias: the real estate holdings 
and the governance quality are co-determined by some unknown and 
unobservable factor. Though admitting this, we have no clearly suitable 
instrumental variable to solve the problem. 
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7. Statistics and Regression Results 
7.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents the mean value and standard deviation of every variable 
contained in our objective functions for the full sample. Both Table 3(1) and 
Table 3 (2) show correlation between variables that explaining 1998 
corporate real estate holding in the full sample. And Table 4 (1), (2), (3)，and 
(4) reports all of the statistical figures of firm characteristics variables as 
well as governance variables for every country included in our full sample. 
In Table 2, we find that the mean PPE ratio of 1998 full sample is 0.340 and 
the standard deviation is 0.244, both are calculated for 10959 observations. 
For variables related to firm characteristics, the average Cash Flow per 
Share is 832.339, while the mean Free Cash Flow is 0.163. The mean value 
of Ln Sales is 11.955, which is corresponding to an average value of 
$1556MM of Sales revenue for the full sample. The mean Market to Book 
value for the full sample is 5.665, and the standard deviation is 159.071 
which is the largest one among variables in the sample. The mean Level of 
Debt, i.e., the ratio of long-term debt to total asset, is 0.141 and its standard 
deviation value is 0.551. The average Business Segments is 3.169，which 
presents that corporations from the 42 countries in our full sample engage in 
about 3 business segments in general. Finally, we obtained the mean value 
of No Dividend that is 0.270，which shows that there are 27% of firms with 
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no dividend payout in year 1997. And this figure is quite close to Chu's 
results obtained from U.S. samples. 
For variables related to corporate governance, the average Herfindahl Index 
for our 42 countries full sample is 0.111，while the standard deviation is 
0.189. A very interesting thing is that the mean Balance Index is 0.100 and 
its standard deviation is also 0.189, both are quite close to Herfindahl Index. 
According to Table 3 (1) and (2), we have also realized that Herfindahl 
Index and Balance Index are highly correlated and correlation between them 
is larger than 0.6 (even equal to or larger than 0.8). Therefore, we do not 
include them in our regression objective functions at the same time in order 
to avoid collinearity problems. Next, the average Cash Flow Rights to 
Control Rights ratio (CF/CR) is 0.807 and the standard deviation is about 
0.292. Based on this statistics, we concluded that the degree of the 
separation of the two rights in our full sample is not quite obvious and the 
standard deviation of this variable is low. The mean Own=20%Control 
index for our full sample is 16.778%, which presents that a shareholder need 
to obtain 16.8% of cash flow rights in average in order to get hold of 20% 
control rights of a firm. The mean value of Dual Class Structure dummy is 
0.324 and the average of Pyramids is 0.309. The average of Control through 
Multiple Chains dummy is 0.054，while this value for Cross-holdings is 
0.010. According to our statistics, Duality problems exist in 34% of firms in 
general, and the difference of this index between Western European 
countries and Asian countries is quite large. Besides, 44% of firms form the 
Western European countries in our sample have a ‘controlling alone’ 
shareholder in their boards. For statistics of public governance measures, 
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please refer to La Porta et al (1998) and the 1997 Annual Report of the 
Economic Freedom of the World. 
Besides, we give a distribution chart - Chart 1 for the dependent variable. 
7.2. Regression Results 
7.2.1. Univariate results and multivariate results of 22 countries in 
the Panel A 
In Table 5 (I) and Table 5 (II), we report the regression results using the 
Panel A dataset that includes the control variables describe in the Section V, 
corporate governance variables including the ratio of Cash Flow Rights to 
Control Rights (at the 20% cutoff), Herfindahl Index, Balance Index, 
Pyramids (dummy variable), Dual Class Structure (dummy variable), 
Management (Duality) (dummy variable), Managerial Ownership, and 
Board Composition (outside directors) and ten public governance variables 
describe in the Section IV. All of the estimated coefficients and T-statistics 
are shown in Table 6. The bold black letters, a, b, and c，correspond with 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. In our result tables, we 
also mark the estimated coefficients that are at the 15% level with the bold 
black letter d, but we will say that these estimated coefficients are not 
statistically significant in our study. 
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Now we report the regression results as follows: 
(1) In Table 5 (I), we report the regression results when regressing the 1998 
PPE/TA on the ratio of Cash Flow Rights to Control Rights (at the 20% 
cutoff), Herfindahl Index, Balance Index, Pyramids (dummy variable), Dual 
Class Structure (dummy variable), Management (Duality) (dummy variable), 
Managerial Ownership, and Board Composition (outside directors) and ten 
public governance variables described in Section IV. In general, the 
observations for each time of test are ranging from 3545 to 4332. The R-
squared of the full sample multivariate result is 8.26%. The estimated 
coefficients deliver the predicted signs not only in the univariate results but 
also in the multivariate results. The estimated coefficients of Ln Sales exert 
unstable signs, which are still consistent with previous works. Because there 
is presently no empirical agreement whether the size effect on real estate 
holdings is positive or negative. We notice that the estimated coefficient of 
Ln Sales is -0.0050 and significant at the 5% level in the multivariate results 
column. This is consistent with relevant results of Redman and Tannner 
(1991) in which the authors found that the firms with fewer assets are more 
likely to own real estate assets. The coefficient for the growth opportunities 
(M/B) is negative (the average value is quite close to -0.00002 and it is very 
stable) and significant at about 10% level (sometimes at 15% level) both in 
the columns of univariate results and multivariate results. These results 
empirically support the hypothesis that firms with good growth opportunities 
and higher market expectations may attempt to hold much more cash instead 
of real estate assets. But the average value of the coefficients is about -
0.00002 which presents a weak impact on real estate holdings. Remarkably, 
the coefficients of Long Term Debt (LT Debt) are very significant (all of the 
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results are significant at the levels which are higher than 1%) in all of 
univariate results and multivariate results. This may be because corporations 
surely need to use a large amount of mortgage to hold excessive real estate 
assets. Also, the coefficients of LT Debt in Table 5 (I) are larger than any 
other ones - sometimes it is larger than 0.10 - and have the strongest 
explanatory power to firms' excessive real estate holdings. Besides, the 
signs of the estimated coefficients of the number of segments (Business 
Segments) are negative, but it is not significant (T-statistics is -1.13 in the 
column of multivariate results) when regressing real estate holdings on both 
corporate governance and public governance. However, the coefficient of 
Business Segments exerts negative signs and 1% significance level when 
regressing PPE/TA on corporate governance. It can support the argument 
that corporations that focus on a small number of business lines may take 
real estate asset as a way to diversify their firm risk. However, we fail to find 
any evidence to support that firms with no dividend payout hold less real 
estate in their asset portfolio. On the contrary, Chu (2006) found 
significantly negative relationship between firms' dividend payout policies 
and their real estate holdings. One possible explanation is that this kind of 
difference may stem from the selection of sample. Chu's study focuses on 
US dataset yet mine is focusing on a cross-country sample. The impact of 
dividend policy on our dependent variable may be more significant and 
important for US but may be eliminated more or less when using a cross-
country dataset to repeat the same work. All in all, except Free Cash Flow 
and No Dividend, the estimated coefficients of other control variables obtain 
the predicted signs and are consistent with corresponding previous literatures. 
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Secondly, we report the regression results of corporate governance variables 
in Table 5 (I). According to the multivariate results, we can say that we find 
evidence supporting that corporate governance strength is negatively related 
to real estate holdings. We will report the results concerning every corporate 
governance variable as follows: in the last column of Table 5 (I) the dummy 
variable "Dual Class Structure" is positive and is significant at the 5% level 
indicating that firms with dual class shares may be inclinable to hold more 
real estate assets. Similarly, Board Composition has a significantly negative 
impact on firms，real estate holdings which indeed indicates that the 
presence of outside directors is effective to monitor managers and ensure 
that they act in the interests of shareholders, but not pursuing personal 
benefits in the form of excessive investment in real estate. The coefficient of 
Managerial Ownership is negative and is statistically significant in Table 5 (I) 
indicating that a greater percentage of a manager's compensation that is 
equity-based may give managers more incentives to maximize firm value 
and avoid pursuing personal benefits. The coefficient of Cash Flow Rights to 
Control Rights (CF/CR) is negative (-0.0107) but not statistically significant 
(at the 15% level) in the whole sample of 22 European and Asian countries. 
The results did not provide powerful support for our hypothesis that 
significant discrepancies between ownership and control in a corporation 
(lower CF/CR ratio) may lead to higher real estate holdings. According to 
previous literatures, separating control rights from cash flow rights can 
create agency costs in an order of magnitude larger than the costs associated 
with a controlling shareholder who also has a majority of the cash flow 
rights in his or her firm. 16 We look upon the separation of the two rights as a 
source of deterioration of corporate governance. Thus the significant 
16 Please refer to Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) 
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discrepancy of the two rights may lead to excessive real estate holdings. 
However, our results could not strongly support this hypothesis. The 
coefficient on the Herfindahl Index has a positive sign (0.0334) and is 
statistically significant, consistent with our conjecture that the concentration 
of ownership structure has a positive impact on real estate holdings. Of 
course, some previous literatures found a negative relationship between firm 
value and ownership concentration using certain datasets of certain countries 
and continents. In addition, as what we will report in the next sub-section, 
signs of Herfindahl Index vary a lot for the European sample and the Asian 
Sample. But here we still accept positive sign of Herfindahl Index for the 
full sample of 22 countries. In the last column of Table 5 (I) Balance Index 
is positive but very insignificant indicating that check-and-balance effect 
may not play a role in constraining real estate holdings. The dummy variable 
“Pyramids，，attracts a positive coefficient which is not statistically significant 
(at the 15% level). This result could not support a sort of positive 
relationship between the presence of pyramids structure in a firm's 
ownership structure and real estate holdings. Surprisingly, we fail to find any 
significant relation between Management and corporate real estate in this 
sample (but also in a few other samples). A potential interpretation of this 
problem is that the definitions of Management in the dataset of Faccio & 
Lang (2002) and Claessens et al (2002) have a few differences. In Faccio & 
Lang (2002) "Management" is defined as follows: a member of the 
controlling family is said to be in "management" if he/she is the CEO, 
Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or Vice-Chairman. However, Claessens et al. 
defined Management as the general definition of Duality: the CEO or 
Chairman comes from one of the controlling families. Strictly speaking, the 
dummy variable "Management" here is not consistent with the traditional 
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definition of "Duality", which is equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also 
the chairman of the board. The dummy variable "Management" in our paper 
is limited to family-controlled corporations because it is hard to trace the 
identities of the directors and CEOs in other corporations. This kind of 
inconsistency may results in a bias in the regression result. Moreover, the 
coefficient of Balance Index is not statistically significant indicating that we 
can not support our hypothesis of the relation between check-and-balance 
effect between the largest shareholders and firms' real estate holdings. 
Finally, we present the regression results concerning public governance 
indexes in Panel A. Most of the public governance variables behave 
generally as expected. Firstly, Legal System & Property Rights attracts a 
negative coefficient with 1% significance level, indicating that a perfect and 
strong legal system as well as effective protection of property rights may 
effectively deter excessive investment in real estate caused by managers' 
'tunneling' behavior in corporations. In our empirical practice, Legal System 
is closely interconnected with public governance level in most cases. 
Secondly, Regulation made by the government also attracts a negative and 
very significant coefficient, which we interpret as strong and strict 
administrative regulation, may have strong validity of constraint on over-
investment in real estate and present a stable relationship with real estate 
holdings. Thirdly, the coefficient on the proxy of Starting a New Business is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. A higher value of this 
index means more time that firms must spend on their new businesses, 
including a new real estate business, of course. However, the results should 
not suggest and encourage an increase in time needed to start a new business 
or a reduction in government efficiency. Risk of Expropriation is an index 
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retrieved from La Porta et al. (1998), which presents a negative coefficient 
and is very significant. Besides, we can find in Table 5 (I) that Corruption 
displays predicted negative sign but the coefficients are not statistically 
significant (at the 15% level both in our univariate results and multivariate 
results). We predicted that moving swiftly to punish corruption may lead to 
reduce firms' excessive real estate investment, especially reduce those 
extravagant buildings and luxurious apartments which are provided for avid 
enjoyment of firms' managers. However, our result could not strongly 
support the negative relationship between real estate holdings and 
Corruption index. Surprisingly, Anti-director Rights attracts a positive sign 
and is significant at the 1% level which is far beyond our anticipation. One 
possibility is that we have high collinearity - some corporate governance 
measures especially those measures regarding Board Composition or outside 
directors may be highly correlated with Anti-director Rights. Another 
possibility is that the sample variation of the indexes of Anti-director Rights 
in Panel A is low. Of course, we are also trying to find an appropriate 
interpretation of a positive relation between Anti-director Rights and real 
estate holding, but this attempt requires more empirical works to support too. 
Finally, we present that certain other variables, such as Accounting 
Standards, Size of Government, and Time with Government Bureaucracy do 
not behave as expected. We do not obtain significant results of these three 
indexes when joining all of the independent variables to conduct the 
regression work. Our interpretation to these unexpected results is that these 
indexes are quite indirectly correlated with real estate holding and have 
inadequate explanatory power on real estate investment. Nevertheless, Time 
with Government Bureaucracy and Size of Government still attract predicted 
positive coefficients both of which are significant at the 1% level when 
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employing each of them as a sole public governance measure to conduct the 
cross-sectional regression. Accounting Standards presents no significant 
negative correlation with real estate holding in the multivariate results and 
attracts significant positive correlation with our dependent variable for the 
univariate test, which is far beyond our prediction and is not consistent with 
corresponding results in similar literatures. 
(2) In Table 5 (II)，we include The Largest Shareholder's Cash Flow Stake 
and The Largest Shareholder's Control Rights but exclude Herfindahl Index 
and Balance Index to do the similar regression works as presented in part (1). 
Our aim of doing this is to examine the impact of cash flow rights and voting 
rights of the largest shareholder in a firm on this firm's real estate holding 
behavior. Refer to the multivariate results shown in Table 5 (II)，The Largest 
Shareholder's Cash Flow Rights presents a negative coefficient but is not 
statistically significant (at the 15% level). We hypothesized that increasing 
the ultimate ownership of the largest shareholder may be favorable to limit 
managerial expropriation more or less. But our result could not give 
powerful support for this hypothesis. On the contrary, The Largest 
Shareholder's Control Rights (its corresponding voting rights in the board) 
shows a positive sign which is significant at the 15% level (it is significant at 
the 10% level for its univariate result). In order to avoid any collinearity 
problem, we exclude CF/CR, Herfindahl Index, and Balance Index when 
conducting the regression work at this time. 
7.2.2. Univariate results and multivariate results of 42 countries in 
the Panel B 
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We present our univariate results as well as multivariate results in Table 6, 
corresponding to the full-sample cross-country test that regresses real estate 
holdings on public governance measures using Panel B data that includes 42 
countries. We include the determinants of real estate holdings and all of the 
ten public governance measures which have been discussed in Section IV. 
All of the estimated coefficients and T-statistics are shown in Table 6. The 
bold black letters, a, b, c, and d, correspond to significance levels at 1%, 5%, 
10% and 15% respectively. For multivariate results, we can see that firm 
characteristics measures behave generally as expected. Leverage (LT Debt) 
still attracts the biggest positive coefficients which are very significant at 
levels higher than 1%. Growth Opportunity (M/B) presents negative sign, 
which is even equal to the coefficient in the multivariate result of Panel A, 
and is statistically significant. On the contrary, Size Effect (Ln Sales) attracts 
positive coefficient which is significant at the 5% level. Our results are 
consistent with Sharpe & Nguyen (1995) which empirically found that the 
influence of firm size on owing is positive and significant, and owing may 
be more or less correlated with real estate investment. Free Cash Flow still 
presents no significant influence on real estate holding. Though, dummy 
variable “No Dividend" (dividend payout policy) attracts a negative and 
very significant coefficient in the full sample of 42 countries. Smith & Watts 
(1992) pointed out that dividend should be lowest for those firms with the 
greatest risk of facing the underinvestment problem. So firms with low or no 
dividend payout (cash payout) may trend to lease rather than own PPE to 
reduce the cost of funding. Some other scholars found empirical results in 
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I 
this areai7. Sometimes, Business Segment presents a negative and 
significant coefficient. 
Most of public governance variables present predicted influence effects on 
firm real estate holdings using the Panel B dataset containing 42 countries to 
perform the cross-sectional regression. Almost every public governance 
variable attracts the coefficients having the same sign with the 
corresponding results in Table 5 (I) & (II). An exception is Corruption index. 
As we report above in 7.2.1 (1)，Corruption presents negative signs that are 
not statistically significant (at about 15% levels). But in the results of Panel 
B, it attracts a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. Besides, the 
coefficient of Corruption in the univariate result is also negative and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that Corruption index has a stable 
negative relationship with real estate holdings. Managers of corporations in 
the countries with more corrupted administrations more commonly take real 
estate investment as one excellent way to keep corporate earnings for their 
own benefits. 
7.2.3. Univariate results and multivariate results of 13 Western 
European countries and 9 Eastern Asian countries 
As we mentioned in Section VI, Panel A consists of nine East Asian 
countries chosen by Claessens et al (2002) and thirteen Western European 
countries selected by Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang (2002). Therefore, we can 
17 Such as Sharpe & Nguyen (1995) 
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split Panel A into two sub-sections: Panel Al and Panel AIL Panel Al 
contains several firm characteristics variables, all of the corporate variables 
(please note that Faccio & Lang (2002) provide more ownership variables 
such as Cross Holdings, Control through Multiple Chains, and Controlling 
Alone 18) for firms in the thirteen Western European countries, and all of the 
public governance measures. Panel All contains data of nine East Asian 
countries. Table 7 (1) & (2) report the univariate results and multivariate 
results for Western European countries. Tables 8 (I) (1)，(2) and Table 8 (II) 
report the results for East Asian countries. 
Please note that our first step in regressing real estate holdings on public 
governance and corporate governance is to take CF/CR, Herfindahl Index, 
Balance Index, Dual Class Structure, Pyramids, Cross-holdings, Control 
through Multiple Chains, Controlling alone, Management as corporate 
governance measures and take three measures in La Porta et al (1998) as 
public governance variables. Yet in the second step we add some other 
public governance measures in the Annual Reports of the Economic 
Freedom of the World to employ a total of ten public governance measures 
accompanying the above corporate governance measures to conduct similar 
regression work. We report the results of the first step regression work in 
Table 7(1) and Table 8 (II) for Western European countries and East Asian 
countries respectively. And we also present the results of the second step 
work in Table 7 (2) and Table 8 (I) (including Table 8 (I) (1) and Table 8 (I) 
(2)). 
18 For the details of definitions of these corporate variables, please refer to Table 1. 
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We are here to report the regression results of Western European countries 
and main East Asian countries. On the whole, most of the estimated 
coefficients of the major control variables deliver the predicted signs as 
expected except Free Cash Flow and No Dividend. Ln Sales attracts positive 
and quite significant coeffients for univariate regression and multivariate 
regression, indicating that sales scales have positive influence on real estate 
holdings for chief Western European countries. Growth Opportunies (M/B) 
presents negative signs that is significant at about the 1% level for Western 
European countries. This would in turn imply that firms with greater growth 
opportunities in the major Western European countries may have more 
incentives to avoid cash shortage or financial distress and hence hold more 
cash by choosing to rent instead of owning real estate. However, on the 
contrary, in Table 8 (II) Growth Opportunities (M/B) yet attracts 
insignificant sign empirically, indicating that there may not exist significant 
negative relationship between real estate holdings and growth opportunities 
of firms in East Asian countries. Level of Debt (LT Debt) still attracts a 
positive and very significant coefficient for main Western European 
countries. For multivariate results in Table 7 (1)，Cash Flow Rights to 
Control Rights (CF/CR) presents a negative and significant coefficient (at 
the 10% significance level) while Dual Class Structure attracts a positive and 
very significant coefficient. Besides, Controlling Alone, which means that 
the firm is controlled alone by a shareholder at the 20% cutoff level, presents 
a positive and very significant coefficient, indicating a strong relationship 
between excessive real estate holdings and 'controlling alone' phenomenon 
for 13 Western European countries. Balance Index and Cross-holdings 
attract predicted coefficients that are both significant in their respective 
univariate results. Nevertheless, Herfindahl Index yet attracts a negative and 
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very significant coefficient in its univariate result for main Western 
European countries, indicating that more concentrated ownership structure in 
Western European countries is coupled with a smaller proportion of real 
estate in a firm's total asset portfolio. On the contrary, Herfidahl Index 
presents a positive and significant sign in its univariate result column in 
Table 8 (I), indicating that ownership concentration may be positively 
related with real estate holdings for East Asian countries. A firm with more 
concentrated ownership or even being controlled by a shareholder alone may 
hold a larger proportion of real estate in its total asset portfolio. In Table 7(1) 
Rule of Law and Disclosure (Accounting Standards) attract predicted 
negative and very significant coefficients as expected, however, surprisingly, 
Anti-director Rights presents a positive and very significant (at the 1% 
significance level) coefficient, which is more difficult than we have 
bargained for. Up to now, we have not found an appropriate and reasonable 
interpretation of this result. Perhaps this unexpected result may result from a 
low deviation of Disclosure index in La Porta et al (1998) distinguished 
from other public governance indexes in it. On the whole, public governance 
indexes behave generally as expected and similarly in the two continents. 
Except for Rule of Law, Anti-director Rights, and Dislosure, some other 
indexes retreived from the Annual Report of the Economic Freedom of the 
World present significant signs as expected. For instance, Starting a New 
Business always attracts a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that firms in those countries in which starting and approving 
a new business is more difficult hold comparatively smaller proportions of 
real estate assets in their portfolios. Corruption and Risk of Exproriation 
both attract negative corfficients that are significant at the 5% levels for 
European and Asian countries. Time with Government Bureuacracy presents 
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positive signs that are significant at the 10% levels for Western European 
and East Asian countries, indicating that lower government efficiency may 
be empirically coupled with less real estate holdings. 
7.2.4. Interaction Effects 
According to our empirical results, the interaction effect between corporate 
finance measures and public governance measures behave unsteadily and 
irregularly. However, the interaction effect term that links Managerial 
Ownership, Board Composition and public governance measure Legal 
System & Property Rights attracts predicted sign that is significant at about 
15% level, indicating that a better legal environment in a country may 
efficiently advance managers' work. This is a kind of 'complementary' 
effect between corporate governance and public governance. Moreover, we 
also obtained that Herfindahl Index are highly correlated with Anti-director 
Rights index and their interaction effect term presents significant result, 
indicating that swingeing anti-director rights can effectively deter the over-
concentration of power in boards of directors. Some results concerning 
“Interaction Effect” are reported in Table 11. 
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8. Robustness Check 
In this section, we run back over the whole process of our regression work in 
previous sections and check the robustness of our empirical work. 
As we mentioned in the sub-section 6.1 - Data Summary, we followed the 
conventions in previous literatures to exclude financial firms as well as real 
estate firms from our initial sample because the objective of our study is to 
analyze the Plant, Property, and Equipment owned by firms that are not 
primarily engaged in real estate business. 
We basically measure real estate holdings (PPE/TA, dependent variable) in 
1998 and the explanatory variables (firm characteristics variables) over the 
period of 1995-1997. Therefore, we have actually embedded an assumption 
of 'time delay effect’ or 'lagged effect' in our empirical analysis structure. 
We predicted in a transcendental way that the influence of those explanatory 
variables on real estate holdings would emerge in 1998. However, someone 
may raise doubt about this choice of time delay and its influence on our final 
empirical work. To solve this problem and raise the robustness of our 
regression work, we take the average value of Plant, Property, and 
Equipment of each firm over the period of 1995-1998 as a new dependent 
variable to conduct the same regression job. We compare the former results 
and new results in Table 10 and find that the firm characteristics variables as 
well as governance variables behave quite similarly in the two regressions. 
Almost all of the explanatory variables attract the same coefficients with the 
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similar significance levels. In addition, in order to reduce the possibility that 
the results based on cross-sectional regressions are only valid on the 
specifically selected sample, we should further build some new datasets over 
different time periods to repeat the same work to check the robustness of our 
conclusion. Chu (2006) used U.S. data (mainly from Compustat) to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance and real estate holdings. He 
traced the firms in the 1998 sample four-year forward to build a new sample 
named 2002 sample to conduct the same regression work. According to his 
results, most of measures behave quite similarly in the 1998 sample and 
2002 sample. We have put this way into practice in our sample for some 
certain countries and found similar results in different time periods, but we 
did not take the same action in the full sample due to the limitation of 
availability of data and volume of work. We hope for further works on 
solving this problem in a satisfactory way. 
Next, we notice that Panel A and Panel B contain a large amount of firms 
from quite different industries, such as IndustryTransportation, Utility, 
Services and Others. Brounen & Eichholtz (2005) recommended that the 
ratio of real estate holdings to total assets in a firm changes very much 
across different kinds of industries. Further, researchers suggested that 
corporations from different industries exhibit distinct real estate investment 
decisions. In consideration of possible different behavior of firm 
characteristics variables and governance measures across industries, we 
follow Chu (2006)'s way to split our full sample into two sub-samples. One 
of them is named "Industry-Transportation-Utility" (ITU), in which 
“Industry” here in the Worldscope datasets mainly includes Mineral, 
In the Worldscope datasets, corporations are categorized into Banks, Insurance, Industry (including 
Mineral, Architecture, Manufacturing), Transportation, Utility, Services, and Others. 
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Architecture, and Manufacturing industry sectors. And the other sub-sample 
is “Services-Others，，(SO). Please note that Trade sector is not included in 
our sub-samples due to different categories of Worldscope data from 
Compustat. The basis of such category is that the firms which are engaged in 
Mineral, Architecture and Manufacturing generally need more real estate 
assets yet firms from tertiary industry may require lower proportions of real 
estate assets to their total assets. We will conduct the same regression work 
to look at the distinct performances of explanatory variables across 
industries of different characteristics. 
In Table 10，we present the regression result of sample “ITU，，and "SO". 
Among firm characteristics variables, LT Debt, Sizes, M/B attract the same 
signs that are significant at similar significance levels as expected in both 
"ITU" and “SO，，sub-samples. Firms with lower free cash flow in the sample 
"ITU" tend to hold a smaller amount of real estate assets, but such result 
cannot be found in "SO" sectors. We cannot obtain any significant empirical 
result concerning the relationship between corporate real estate decisions 
and dividend policies (No Dividend). Additionally, firms in "ITU" hold a 
smaller amount of real estate if they have well-diversified business segments 
and the same result cannot be observed in “SO，，sample. This conclusion is 
quite similar with Chu's. For corporate governance measures, Herfindahl 
Index, Balance Index, and Board Composition attract predicted signs that are 
statistically significant in "ITU" sectors, but they cannot present the similar 
results for firms in “SO，，samples. One of our interpretations of this 
phenomenon is that the scales of companies and their boards of directors in 
“ITU” industries are usually larger than firms from the tertiary industry. 
Other corporate governance measures behave quite similarly in the two sub-
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samples. All in all, we find that the relationship between corporate 
governance measures and corporate real estate holdings is comparatively 
stronger in "ITU" sector. It may be mainly attributed to the dimensions of 
the difficulty for over-investment in real estate between the two industry 
groups. It is easier for management in a firm from "ITU" sector to wait for 
this chance to invest in real estate assets which may be not necessary for 
firm's growth and just be used for personal enjoyment of management. 
Next, our robustness check will focus on our choices of corporate 
governance measures and public governance measures. In Chu (2006) CEO 
Compensation Structure, Duality, Outside Blockholder Ownership, and 
Board Composition are selected to jointly measure different governance 
levels in different firms. In consideration of characteristic of cross-country 
study and availability of cross-country data, we imply Ownership Structure 
measures (such as Herfindahl Index, Balance Index, and Cash Flow Rights 
to Control Rights, Pyramids, Cross-holdings, Dual Class Structure, and 
Controlling Alone), agency problem between board and management 
(Duality, Managerial Ownership) and Board Composition as our corporate 
governance measures. Using this series of corporate governance measures to 
examine their influences on corporate real estate holdings can help to 
improve Chu's work and obtain more valuable results. For relevant 
conclusions, please refer to Section 7.2. What is more, we pay more 
attention to collinearity while regressing various governance measures on 
firm real estate holdings. For example, in order to avoid collinearity, we 
separately examine the influence of ownership concentration (Herfindahl 
Index) and The Largest Shareholder's Ownership on real estate holdings 
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because these two measures may be highly correlated with each other. We 
show these differences in Table 5 (I) and Table 5 (II). 
At the beginning of our study plan, we prepared to follow Kose John et al 
(2005) to select Rule of Law, Anti-director Rights, and Disclosure as our 
three public governance measures. However, gradually we realized that 
Kose John et al focused more on a cross-country empirical examination of 
relationship between corporate governance and risk taking behavior of 
management. Nevertheless our dependent variable is PPE/TA but not risk 
taking level. So we found that these three measures are far from our pressing 
needs to obtain a set of more comprehensive measures of different public 
governance levels in different countries, and these measures should attract 
significant influence on real estate holdings. Firstly, we added Corruption, 
Risk of Expropriation, and Efficiency of Judicial System into the group of 
measurement of public governance. According to Table 6，Corruption index 
and Risk of Expropriation index present negative coefficients that are 
significant at the 15% level and 1% level respectively. Also, Risk of 
Expropriation attracts a negative sign that is significant at the 1% level in the 
univariate result column. Similar results can be observed in other Tables. 
However, Efficiency of Judicial System attracts no significant coefficient 
when regressing it alone on real estate holdings. In the final formal 
regression work, several public measures provided by the 1997 Annual 
Report of the Economic Freedom of the World are added to be explanatory 
variables. After integrating the public governance measures in La Porta et al 
(1998) and measures in EFW ten measures are selected to take part in the 
regression work for Panel B. Legal System & Property Rights, Corruption 
index, and Starting a New Business all attract predicted coefficients that are 
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significant at the 1% level. Regulation made by the government presents a 
negative sign that is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
Risk of Expropriation and Size of Government present the desired signs that 
are only weakly significant at the 15% significance level. However, Anti-
director Rights presents a positive and very significant coefficient in the 
multivariate result in Table 6，and the same results can be observed in almost 
every regression work in our paper. As mentioned in previous sections, a 
possible cause of this phenomenon is the very small deviation of Anti-
Director Rights indexes among different countries. Law & Order and Time 
with Government Bureaucracy did not present predicted signs that are 
statistically significant when they are entered jointly into the objective 
function together with other public measures, but they attract predicted 
coefficients that are very significant when entered individually. 
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9. Conclusions 
In this paper, we consider the relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance, country-level public governance and corporate real estate 
holdings. According to our cross-country empirical study for a enormous 
datasets totally including 11321 corporations from 42 countries, we confirm 
the existence of some negative relationship between corporate governance, 
public governance environment and corporate real estate holdings. 
Meanwhile, our work extended previous studies, especially Chu (2006), to a 
cross-country background and further forcefully pointed out that real estate 
holding does not actually add value. Moreover, based on the negative 
relationship between governance strength and real estate holdings, we have 
some reason to believe that over-investment in real estate asset may be 
coupled with poor corporate governance and public governance. The over-
centralization of ownership structure, weak and inefficient check-and-
balance of the first largest shareholders from other large shareholders, lower 
degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights, lower agency cost 
between shareholders and CEOs, and outside board are all related with a 
smaller amount of real estate holdings. Besides, the efficiency of 
government officials, the level of development of legal system for a country, 
accounting standards, corruption, risk of expropriation, time for starting a 
new business and other public governance measures also present negative 
influences on corporate real estate decisions. Based on these empirical 
results, firm management as well as government leaders can adopt some 
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corresponding policies aiming at improving corporate governance and public 
governance environment to restrict corporate managers' real estate decisions 
with reasonable limits. All in all, better corporate governance and public 
governance environment lowers the expected private benefits, causing 
managers to be better aligned with shareholders in their investment choices. 
Finally, we hope that further research on this topic will shed further light on 
this. First, in order to reduce the possibility that the results based on cross-
sectional regression are only valid on the selected sample period, someone 
can further trace those firms in the 1998 sample several years forward to 
build new samples to re-examine the empirical results. Second, how to 
separate real over-investment behaviors in real estate assets from normal 
investment decisions in our sample? Third, how to construct a mathematical 
model, just like the theoretical model in Kose John et al. (2005), to support 
our empirical work. Besides, we give our careful attention to the problem of 
reverse causality when we conduct our regression work. We have noticed 
that the governance variables could be endogenous. There could be reverse 
causality: more real estate holdings could allow management or controlling 
shareholder to have more chances or ways to misuse physical capital to 
satisfy their demand for private benefits. There could be latent variable bias: 
the real estate holdings and the governance quality are co-determined by 
some unknown and unobservable factor. Though admitting this, we have no 
clearly suitable instrumental variable to solve the problem. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
MainVariables Source Year 
Dependent Variable: 
PPE(net)/TA, i.e., 
PPE/TA The ratio of property, plant Worldscope 98 1998 
and equipment to total asset, 
both in net book value 
The average value of Worldscope 95, 96， Average of 1996-
Avemge i-ifii.! a ppE(net)/TA of 1995-1998 97，98 1998 
Firm Characteristics 
Operating income before 
depreciation minus interest 
Free Cash Flow ^ Worldscope 95, 96，97 of 
dividends divided by book 
value of total assets 
M/B Market value to book value Worldscope 95, 96, 97 of 1995-1997 
Ln Sales ($MM) Worldscope 95,96,97 on995A991 
LT DEBT Long term debt/ Total Asset Worldscope 95，96，97 of 
, . , Number of business Worldscope 95,96,97 1997 
Business segment segments reported by ^ 
Worldscope and Datastream 
A dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if the company 
„ ., , pays no dividends in year Worldscope 97 1997 
JNo uivmena 蘭 ^^^ otherwise it is 
equal to 0 
64 
. 、, . , , Deflmtion and „ 、7 




Faccio, Lang (2002) 
collected data on 
ownership from 
1996 to 1999 for 13 
The ratio of Cash Flow ^ Faccio Larrv Western European 
Cash Flow Rights to Rights of the largest countries 
Control Rights Ratio shareholder (20% cutoff) to ^tl^n a i s s e n s a T ^ , , 
(CF/CR) its Control Rights (Voting 叫 n <-laessens, et al. Claessenset al. 
Rights) (•zj collected 1996 data 




The sum of the squares of 
the cash flow stakes from 
the largest shareholder to Mara Faccio, Larry 
the fifth largest shareholder, H.P. Lang (2002), and 1996-1998 
Herfindahl Index which measures the Stijn Claessens, et al. 
concentration of the largest (2002) 
shareholders' cash flow 
rights 
It measures the relative 
degree of the 'balances' 
and 'checks' between the 
largest shareholder and 
other largest 
shareholders. It is h r^  • t 
calculated as follows: The J f f Facc^j^arry 
Balance Index squ^eof 户e largest 眾 n 二 ^ ^ ^ ^ 1996-1998 
shareholder s cash flow 」 （2002) 
stake minus the sum of 
squares of the 
shareholder's cash flow 
stakes from the second 
largest shareholder to the 
fifth largest shareholder 
Firm Y is controlled by a 
cross-holding at the 20% 
threshold if Firm X holds a 1 j^^g 
stake in Firm Y of at least ‘ 
20%，and Y holds a stake Mara Faccio, Larry (data of Austria is 
hnlHinaQ in Firm X at least 20%, or if H.P. Lang (2002) collected from 1999 
uross-noiaings Y holds directly at and 2000) 
least 20% of its own stocks. 
65 
Main Variables Definition and Source Year 
Measurement 
Dual stock issued for a ,, ^ . , 
•, .丄 Mara Faccio, Larry 
var Tn H.P. Lang (2002), and Mainly from 
Dual class shares ；hTrffeereanStS^ g^ieryjlf Stijn Ctosens, et al. 1996 to 1998 
and dividend payments 、 
A firm is said to be 
controlled through ,, „ , 
. . f . ‘ b Mara Faccio, Larry 
pyramids 卩 以 = 0 = ， = ^： ^ ^ Mainly from 
controls this firm indirectly Stijn Ctosens, et al. 1996 to 1998 
through another corporation 、 ) 
that it do not wholly control 
A firm is controlled through 
Controlling through a multiple control chain if it i 
multiple chains has an ultimate owner who 1996-1998 
controls it via a multitude of ‘ 邑、 ) 
control chains 
A controlling shareholder 
is said to be "alone" if no 
Controlling owner other owner controls at Mara Faccio, Larry 1996-1998 
alone least 10% (or 20%) of the H.P. Lang (2002) 
voting rights. 
The average minimum 
percent of the book value of Mara Faccio, Larry , qq^  , 
Own=20%Control equity required to control H.P. Lang (2002) i^^o-iyy^ 
20% of votes. 
The first lareest M a m Faccio, Larry 
c“，fffs；^ h share二e?二二I cash H;R Lang (2002) and 1996-I998 
Shareholder s Cash ^ow stake (both at the 20% Styn Claessens, et al. 
Flow stake threshold) ^ 
Mara Faccio, Larry 
The Largest The first largest H.P. Lang (2002), and 1996-1998 
Shareholder's Control shareholder's ultimate Stijn Claessens, et al. 
Rights control stake (both at the (2002) 
20% threshold) 
D u m m y variable which is 
Duality equal to 1 when the C E O Mara Faccio, Larry 
(Management) meanwhile the ^J： (2002) ai^ d 1997 
” . Stijn Claessens, et al. 
Honorary Chairman, (2002) 
Chairman, or Vice-
Chairman of the board. 
66 
- - . 1 , . . , Definition and ci xr 
Main Variables , , . Source Year 
Measurement 
Total value of stock options 
Managerial granted (using Black- Data Stream 1007 
Ownership Scholes) divided by total ^^^^ stream lyy / 
compensation 
Number of outsider in the 
Board Composition board divided by total n + lorr? 




Economic Freedom of 
1 <5 t Efficiency and integrity of the World (www. 
ga y the legal environment as it freetheworld.com) 1997 
& property Kignts affects business 1997 Dataset Update -
(revised) 
Economic Freedom of 
. ‘ f 丄 1 J the World (www. 
T p ^  . Assessment of the law and . ,, 、 1 oni 
Law & Order , , freetheworld.com) 1997 
order tradition irwit^ * … j / 
1997 Dataset Update -
(revised) 
Economic Freedom of 
Assessment of the the World (www. 
Regulation administrative regulation freetheworld.com) 1997 
drew up by the government 1997 Dataset Update -
(revised) 
, r Economic Freedom of 
It the World (www. 
Size of Government t ^ ^ ‘ ’ freetheworld.com) 1997 
Taxes, Government 例？ —set Update -
Enterprises, etc. (revised) 
, . . Economic Freedom of 
Starting a new business IS the World (www. 
Statin亭 a New generally easy or not. I is freetheworld.com) 1997 
Business based on the amount of time ^^^^ dataset Update -
taken to start a new business , . 
(revised) 
Economic Freedom of 
Time with Government The level of efficiency in 已^已七^ 犷^！‘^匚"^ )^ 1997 
Bureaucracy government bureaucracy (997 D^set Update -
(revised) 
ICR (International Country 
Risk Guide)'s assessment of 
^ , the corruption in Law and Finance ioorv< 
Corruption government. Scale from 0 to (La Porta et al. (1998)) ^id 1990s 
10，with lower scores for 
higher levels of corruption 
Examining and rating 
Accounting Standard ^ ^ ( U P ： ： ； ' ^ ^ ) 麗 9 9 0 s 
omission of 90iterms 
67 
. . , , Definition and 。 
Mam Variables Measurement ^ Year 
ICR's assessmern of the risk m 二 二 
D • … ？ of outright confisca m international Country October of the 
Risk of Expropriation forced nationalization Risk guide monthly index 
Scale from zero to 10’ with between 1985 and 
lower scores for higher risks 1 g^^ 
~~ An index aggregating the 
shareholder rights labeled as , j tr t 
• . J. . ,, ‘  ‘.J. , . ,, „. T Law and Finance, La a/t-j mnn 
Anti-director rights antidirector rights in Law Porta et al (1998) Mid 1990s 
and Finance. The index • 
ranges from zero to six. 
68 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 一 Full Sample 
Summary statistics of variables explaining 1998PPE/TA in the full sample - Panel A & B 
Mean S.D. Max Min Observations 
1QQR PPF/TA 
0.340 0.244 0.992 0.003 10959 
Cash Row/Share 832.339 24742.16 1251336 -3446.16 10023 
^ ^ , „ 0.163 3.348 205 -80.4 10023 
Free Cash Flow 
Ln Sales 11.955 2.342 18.695 1.040 11136 
M/B 5.665 159.071 -121.321 14380.71 9720 
Level of Debt 0.141 0.551 49.891 0 11227 
Business Segments 3.169 1.541 7 1 9375 
TV J 0.270 0.444 1 0 
No Dividend 9205 
Herfindahl Index 0.111 0.189 1 0 7591 
Balance Index 0.100 0.189 1 -0.526 7591 
C a ? 二 ig^fto 0 . 8 0 7 ^ 0 ^ 
Control Rights 
O w n = 20%Control 16.778 6.266 20 0 5623 
Dual-Class Structure 0.324 0.468 1 0 5839 
Pyramids 0.309 0.462 1 0 5670 
曲 ^ ^ ； 0 ^ 
Multiple Chains 
Cross-holdings 0.010 0.101 1 0 3083 
Controlling Alone 0.440 0.496 1 0 3083 




Table 3 (1). Correlation between corporate governance measures and 
firm characteristics variables in the full sample 
Free Dual 
I r-r. u Ln , Level Business No Herfindahl Balance 




Ln Sales 0.117 1 
M/B 0.002 -0.03 1 
Level of Debt 0.004 0.017 -0.00 1 
pusmess o.005 0.179 -0.04 -0.05 , 
Segments 1 
No Dividend -0.10 -0.18 0.032 0.061 ^^^ 1 
Herfindahl Index -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 0.130 0.077 1 
Balance Index -0.003 -0.12 -0.03 -0.036 0.130 0.065 0.961 1 
Cash Flow Rights 
to -0.019 -0.20 0.017 -0.034 -0.043 0.088 0.327 0.328 1 
, Control Rights 
Dual Class o.Oll 0.179 -0.01 0.040 -0.010 -0.047 -0.230 -0.208 -0.367 1 
Structure 
Pyramids -0.017 0.004 -0.02 -0.006 -0.005 -0.032 -0.038 -0.063 -0.354 -0.049 
Own=20%Contrl -0.022 -0.17 -0.01 -0.055 0.036 0.002 0.187 0.171 0.293 -0.466 
tl^ough 0.001 -0.00 -0.01 0.010 -0.045 -0.037 -0.011 -0.019 -0.224 -0.077 
, Multiple Chains 
( 
Cross-holdings 0.013 0.043 -0.00 -0.003 0.063 0.024 -0.060 -0.053 -0.056 -0.001 
Con^olling 0.004 -0.09 -0.03 -0.039 0.126 0.047 0.486 0.538 0.165 -0.048 
Alone 
Management 0.014 -0.07 0.004 -0.015 0.029 0.021 0.099 0.097 0.077 -0.014 
1 
) 
丨 7 0 
I 
Table 3 (2). Correlation between corporate governance measures and 
firm characteristics variables in the full sample - (continued) 
Control 
Pyramids 。二：二% MuWple Cross-holdings Controlling Alone Management 
Chains 
Pyramids 1 
0:n=20% 0.056 1 
Control 
Control toough o.385 0.047 1 
Multiple Chains 
Cross-holdings 0.110 -0.036 0.001 1 
Controlling o.033 0.057 -0.088 -0.082 1 
Alone 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chart 1. Distribution of the dependent variable 一 1998PPE/TA 
The distribution of 1998PPEn"A 
0.2 -1——— 
0.18 --rn^ . • 厂 - — — — 
0.16 一 , .•口 •,..:•——..—————— 
> 0.14 — I I ”~[i|.i _ .V I.. :. . ^ ~ ~ — 
c 0 . 1 2 -一 .：——:..:——;::,——>; I丨 ——~—— 
§ 0.1 - — ：：：' 一 ： 一 V； 一 网 I ~ ^ - ^ ― ^ 
f 0.08 -— •—:‘:.——.:.:,一饭:~ ——._^ 
u. 0.06 -- • — •一 — - ^ 一 ；••； —^ 
0 04 -- . • );: —’ . ; . . < ~ ~一 ：•: __rn 
n i . 、 . i • ： • 
U -r-* r-' '-T-'~^ ―I—"‘―r—'~‘―t—'‘―i—"~‘―r-'~H—'‘―T—'H 
0-0.1 0.1- 0.2- 0.3- 0.4- 0.5- 0.6- 0.7- 0.8- 0.9-
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
1998PPE/rA 
In this chart, we show the distribution of dependent variable - 1998PPE/TA to see if the dependent variable 
is highly skewed. The horizontal axis is divided into ten intervals which are corresponding with the levels 





Table 5 (I). Panel A. Regressing real estate holdings on corporate governance 
and public governance for the firms of 22 countries in the Panel A 
) 
i. 
Dependent Variable: PPE/TA (1998 PPE (net) / Total Assets)) 
Cash Flow Rights to Control Rights Ratio ~ - 0 . 0 3 3 3 - 0 . 0 1 0 7 
(CF/CR) (-1.84) c (-1.58) 
: „ ^ . .,, , 0.0557 0.0334 
Herfindahl Index ,, . . . 
(1.60) (1.44) 
~ ~ 0.0132 0.0008 
B—ce Index (0.19) (0.01) 
^ “ “ 0.0555 0.0170 0.0091 
Pyramids ( 2 ^ (1.54) (1.51) 
I „ , , “ “ 0.0387 0.0207 
： Dual-class Structure (4.56) a (2.21) b 
~ ‘ 0.0007 -0.0028 0.0004 
Man—em ^ (-0.34) (0.05) 
r M 一 一 p 二 
广 BoardComposi- 二 t 二 
I - Legal System -0.0443 -0.0558 
L & Property Rights (-3.42) a (-3.95) a 
T p 〜 -0.0040 0.0032 0.0044 
Law&Qrder ^ (0^ (0.31) 
: “ ~ -0.0649 -0.0796 
1 R — i o n (-3.80) a 
. . J . . ., 0.0170 0.0184 
— Anu-chrector Rights (2.90) a 
‘ ‘ ； . . 0.0041 0.0020 0.0021 
Accounting Standards ( g ^ ( 1 ^ (1.37) 
~ “ 7 1 “ 0.0188 0.0106 0.0094 
Size of Government ( g ^ ( 1 ^ (1.26) 
“ ~ ~-0.0094 -0.0104 
Co_。n (447) (-1.48) 
cv 、， D . 0.0382 0.0428 
Starting a New Business ( 3 ^ (3.53) a 
^ “ 0.0295 0.0131 “ 0.0164 
Time with Government Bureaucracy ( ⑴ ⑶ 3 (1.24) 
^ , r r -0.0303 -0.0354 
Risk of Expropriation (-2.12) b (-2.21) b 
p . p . 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0008 0.0011 
I hreecastiMow (1.03) (1.02) (1.24) (1.03) (0.96) (1.00) (1.25) (0.79) (1.10) 
0.0020 -0.0003 0.0040 0.0020 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0041 -0.0010 -0.0050 
L " 浏 es (1.35) (-0.22) (2.74) a (1.33) (0.99) (0.37) (-2.26) b (0.58) (-2.44) b 
“ -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
) (-1.88) c (-1.01) (-2.00) b (-1.48) c (-1.53) (-1.59) (-1.43) (-1.65) c (-1.62) c 
‘ r r r r " 0.0830 0.0891 0.0799 0.0878 0.1052 0.1046 0.0782 oTo^ 0.0927 
(9.38) a (10.04) a (8.99) a (9.82) a (10.15) a (10.11) a (8.84) a (9.95) a (9.06) a 
“ ； -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0043 -0.0062 -0.0082 -0.0076 -0.0007 -0.0086 -0.0030 
^"siness segments (-1.61) (-1.10) (-1.81) c (-2.59) a (-3.22) a (-2.99) a (-0.30) (-3.35) a (-1.13) 
^ . , , 0.0122 0.0007 0.0121 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0025 0.0023 ~^00051 -0.0036 
： _ iNouiviaeno ( 1 . 4 0 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 1 . 3 7 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( - 0 . 2 4 ) ( - 0 . 2 7 ) ( 0 . 2 6 ) ( - 0 . 5 5 ) ( - 0 . 3 8 ) 
Number of observations 4332 4332 4216 4332 3678 3678 4216 3632 3545 





Table 5 (II). Panel A. Regressing real estate holdings on corporate governance 
and public governance for the firms of 22 countries in the Panel A 
！ — 
Dependent Variable : PPE/TA (1998 PPE (net) / Total Assets)) 
e Largest Shareholder's Cash Flow stake f f ^ O V -00006 
J (.-l.jjj (.-l.jyJ (-1.M ) 
~ r T T T T T T T ^ -0.00018 0.0004 0.0006 
The Largest Shareholder s Control Rights ( 1 00) (1 78) c (1 60) 
一 Dual-Cass Structure ( = ^ ^ 
‘ u • -0.0006 0.0015 
I M 如 agcmcnt (.0.08) (0.17) 
1 u • ,r> -0.0215 -0.0208 丨 
— Managerial Ownership (-1.75) c (-1.67) c 丨 
1 „ ^ ^ -0.0025 -0.0020 
— Board Composition (-2.17) b (-2.1 l ) b 
Legal System -0.0443 -0.0509 
& Property Rights (-3.42) a (-3.60) a 
T p J -0.0040 0.0032 0.0067 
1 Law & Order ^ ^ (0.48) 
I ~ -0.0649 -0.0787 
Regulation (-3.61) a (-3.74) a ‘ 
！ r ~ 7 T 0 . 0 1 7 0 0.0197 
彳— Ant卜director Rights (3.05) a . 
“ ： ~ 0 . 0 0 4 1 0.0020 0.0022 ： 
Accounting Standards (8.32) a (1.40) 
“ _ 0.0188 0.0084 
1 Size of Government (8.59) a ( 1 ^ (1.12) | 
“ 7 " -0.0094 -0.0086 丨 C。卿 tion ^ (-1.55) 
“ “ ： “ 0 . 0 3 8 2 0.0450 
Starting a New Business ( 3 ^ (3.71) a 
" I 0.0295 0.0131 0.0188 
, T i m e with Government Bureaucracy (10.13) a (1.09) (1 40) 
‘ r~ -0.0303 -0.0376 
Risk of Expropriation (-2.12) b (-2.33) b ) 
— p, 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0008 0.0011 
Free Last! mow (1.03) (1.02) (1.24) (1.03) (0.98) (0.99) (1.25) (0.81) (1.11) 
^ 0.0020 -0.0003 0.0040 0.0009 -0.0041 00006 -0.0045 
Ln ⑷ es (1.35) (-0.22) (2.74) a (1.33) (0.68) (0.54) (-2.26) b (0.37) (-2.22) b 
-0.00002 -0.00002-0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
画 (-1.88) c (-1.01) (-2.00) b (-1.48) c (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.43) (-1.60) (-1.55) 
0.0830 0.0891 0.0799 0 0 ^ O l ^ 0.1051 0.0782 0.1047 0.0939 
； L I ^ebt (9.38) a (10.04) a (8.99) a (9.82) a (10.14) a (10.14) a (8.84) a (10.15) a (9.19) a 
" ~ ‘ “ -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0043 -0.0062 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0007 -0.0084 -0.0026 
Business Segments (-1.61) (-1.10) (-1.81) c (-2.59) a (-3.10) a (-3.09) a (-0.30) (-3.30) a (-1.02) 
0.0122 0.0007 0.0121 0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0014 
No Dividend (1.40) (0.08) (1.37) (0.01) (-0.26) (-0.26) (0.26) (-0.34) (-0.14) 
Number of observations 4332 4332 4216 4332 3678 4828 4216 3662 3575 
R-squared (%) 4.84% 4.22% 4.10% 2.63% 3.28% 3.38% 6.97% 4.15% 8.28% 







Table 6. Panel B. Regressing real estate holdings on public governance 
for the companies from all of the 42 countries in the Panel B 
Public 
^ C ^ t r o ? Dependent Variable : Company Real Estate Holdings (PPE/TA) 
Variables 
Legal System _oo246 
&竹 oPerty 
Rights ( 谓 ) a 
T 办 -0.0079 - 0 . 0 0 4 9 '丨 
」 w & Order ( : ⑴ ) & (-1.29) 
I^egulation — 二 t . 
"^ti-director 0.0235 0.0116 
Rights (10.34) a (3.32) a 
Accounting -0.0001 
Standards (-0.20) 
Size of 0.0220 0.0063 
Government (10.70) a (1.48) ‘ 
“ -0.0099 -0.0178~ 
二 0 卿 咖 (-5.65) a (-4.38) a 
"""Starting a 0 . 0 2 2 3 0.0248 
New Business (12.05) a (5.32) a 
"""^ "^mewith ^ -0.0041 
Government (6.31) a (-0.79) 
]B^eaucracy 
Risk of -0.0181 -0.0078 | 
Expropriation (-6.42) a (-1.51) ‘ 
Free Cash 0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 
Flow (0.52) (0.75) (0.50) (0.50) (0.58) (0.58) (0.47) (0.69) 
" " " 0 . 0 0 2 9 0.0028 0.0004 0.0032 -0.0003 0.0030 OOO^ ^ 
bales (2.17) b (2.07) b (0.32) (2.34) b (-0.22) (2.18) b (2.37) b (2.10) b 
~ -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.000024 -0.000024 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00002 
画 (-1.61) (-1.57) (-1.12) (-1.52) (-1.54) (-1.90) c (-1.62) (-1.53) 
oITt? 0.1133 oTT^ oIT87 oIT47 oIT^ olT^ olT^ 
j i u e b t (13.32) a (12.89) a (13.58) a (13.44) a (13.08) a (13.07) a (13.47) a (12.62) a 
B u s b ^ -0.0062 -0.0024 -0.0032 -0.0058 -0.0023 -0.0053 -0.0056 -0.00014 
Segments (-2.99) a (-1.17) (-1.54) (-2.80) a (-1.11) (-2.53) b (-2.71) a (-1.38) 
二 -0.0204 -0.0270 -0.0203 -0.0212 -0.0196 -0.0225 -0.0202 -0.0189 
H o Uivideno (-2.75)3 (-10.34) a (-2.75) a (-2.85) a (-2.64) a (-2.99) a (-2.72) a (-2.49) b 
Number of 6053 6053 6057 6053 6053 6053 5868 5868 
observation 




Table 7 (1). Panel Al. Thirteen Western European countries 
參 Regressing real estate holdings on corporate governance and public governance 
Using the dataset of 13 Western European countries in the Panel A. 
參 In addition, we use La Porta et al. (1998)，s measurements and the other 
measurements of public governance provided by the annual reports of 
Economic Freedom of the World to conduct this cross-country regression work. 
“ Corporate Governance, 
Public Governance and Dependent Variable: Company Real Estate Holdings (PPE/TA) 
Control Variables 
Cash Flow Rights to Control Rights " " “ - 0 . 0 5 0 6 - 0 . 0 2 0 7 
Ratio (CF/CR) (-1.81) c (-1.74) c 
rrTTTTr^ -0.0973 -0.0541 o.o578 
— H e r f i n d a h l Index (-4.06)3 (-0.63) (0.66) 
r ； ~ -0.0942 -0.0405 -0.0951 
Balance Index (-3.99) a (-0.46) (-1.08) 
“ -0.0245 -0.0125 -0.0042~ 
Pyr 讓 ds (-0.68) (-0.23) 
； “ “ 0.0450 0.0428 0.0371 
Dual-class Structure (2.83) a (2.45) a 
~ 0.0306 0.0714 
Cross-holdings (0.51) (1.19) 
Control through -0.0075 -0.0137~ 
Multiple Chains (-0.27) (-0.50) 
“ ^ " " “ ~ -0.0259 0.0068 0.0081 
Controlling Alone (-2.30) b (1.68) c (1.86) c 
“ -0.0075~ -0.0001 
M 肌 3gcmcnt (-0.50) (-0.01) 
•I * .」. T J 0.0325 0.0339 
Anti-d.rector Index ( 5 ^ (5.01) a 
； 7 " 7； -0.0197 -0.0234 
Rule of Law (1.87) c (-1.88) c 
-0.0020 - 0 . 0 0 1 0 ~ 
Disclosure (-1.74) c (-1.91) c 
_ -0.0057 -0.0053 -0.0060 -0.0054 -0.0057 0.0008 -0.0056 -0.0056 
Free Cash MOW (-1.02) (-0.96) (-1.07) (-0.98) (-1.03) (0.79) (-1.00) (-1.02) 
~ 0.0098 000% O ^ OOO^ 0.0092 0.00097 0.0085 0.0101 
L " 划 es (4.88) a (4.61) a (5.15) a (4.60) a (4.57) a (0.58) (4.13) a (4.90) a 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.000025 -0.000025 -0.000025 -0.000016 -0.000022 
I (-1.56) (-1.46) (-1.52) c (-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.65) c (-1.67) c (-1.45) 
I 0.0650 0.0672 0.0661 0.0645 0.0644 0.1026 0.0645 0.0574 
LTDebt (5.84) a (6.12) a (5.95) a (5.81) a (5.80) a (9.95) a (5.82) a (5.16) a 
“ “ -0.0188 -0.0187 -0.0202 -0.0179 -0.0178 -0.0086 -0.0180 -0.0101 
Business Segments (-4.78) a (-4.91) a (-5.14) a (-4.54) a (•4.54) a (-3.35) a (-4.54) a (-2.47) b 
1 """" -0.0070 -0.0045 -0.0091 -0.0054 -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0076 -0.0026~ 
No Dividend (-0.52) (-0.35) (-0.68) (-0.40) (-0.36) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.20) 
Number of observations 1970 2061 1954 1970 1970 2581 1954 1940 






Table 7 (2). Panel Al. Thirteen Western European countries. 
參 Regressing real estate holdings on corporate governance and ten public 
governance measures using the Panel A. 
Dependent Variable: Company Real Estate Holdings fPPE/TA) 
Cash Flow Rights to Control .ooig 
Rights Ratio (CF/CR) (-1.73) d (-1.73) (-2.13) b -0.02(-1.74) 
Herflndahl Index 0 0972 looM 
( 德 ) a (-1.93) c 
Balance Index • 。 q � ） 
I The Largest Shareholder's Cash Flow~ “ -0 0009 
RMlS f-Sna 
The Largest Shareholder's Control .q 0009 ^ ^ 
Pyramids 0.005(0.30) 0.005(0.28) 0.004(0.24) -0.0026(-0.15) 
Dual-class Structure 0.0290 0.0288 0.0284 0.0263 | 
(1.93) c (1.92) c (1.89) c (1.73) c | 
Cross-holdings 0.0583(0.98) 0.0582(0.98) 0.055(0.92) 0.0608(2.02) b ; 
Contro l through Multiple Chains ~ - 0 029 -0.029 ^ 7 7 1 7 7 7 7 ^ ' 
^ ^ “1 . ”、 -00255(-0.93) 
Controlling Alone 0.0068 0.0118 
(-2.30) b (1.68) c (1.89) c 
Management ：。。。： 0.001(0.07) 0.001(0.07) 0.001(0.06) -0.0013(-0.09) 
Managerial Ownership -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 n m-xr i 遍 - 0 . 0 2 3 ( - 1 . 6 8 ) C 
Lega l System & Property Rights -0.06(-2.4)a -0.06(-2.4)a -0.06(-2.4)b -0.059(-2.5) b 丨 
Law & Order -0-0075 -0.01(-0.37) -0.01 (-0.37) -0.001(-0.4) -0.01(-1.83) c | 
二 Regulation -O^Om ^-0.015^ "^2(-1.7)c -0.02(-043j_ ^ O O l g ^ ^ | 
Anti-director Rights ；O。。盟 0.0085(0.82) 0.0085(0.82) 0.0085(0.82) 0.0085(0.82) ‘ 
Accounting Standards -0.0001 ^ ^ n n n v i s^v (-1.94)C M n^)^  -0.003(-1.83)c 
； Size of Government 二、 3 ^.02(-0.75) -0.02(-0.72) -0.02(-0.75) -0.0133(-0.63) | 
Corruption -0.1174 o^Tfs O^ITs ；^TZTTT 
(-4.29) a (-3.53^  a “3 仍 n 0.12(-3.5)a -0.115(-3.51)a ^ 
Starting a New Business 二 二 0.0013(0.08) 0.0014(0.08) 0.0013(0.08) 0.0017(1.80)c 
Time with Government Bureaucracy 二 o . l 3 6 ( 2 . 9 3 ) a 0.135(2.92)a 0.133(2.88)a0.0052(1.54) 
Risk of Expropriation -0.1024 -0.0061 -0.0061 0^0060 nnnfir i7av 
— 旧 、 。 … t -0.006(-1.74)c 
FrPP rash Flow -0 0057 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0008 -0.00034 -0.00034 -0.0033 
Free Cash Flow (-1.02) (-1.03) (-1.03) (-0.17) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.61) -0 0034(-0.63) 
i Ln Sales ^ 0 008f2 4 “ ’ ^ ^ i^Mia (4,57) a__(-3,31) a (-2.38^  h r-2.37^ h (-2.37^  h -0.008(-2.4) a 
M/B -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003 謹 “ 吣 、 
f f f c ^ ^ __(-2.10) h__(-2.10) h r-2.in^h r-9inh _000(-2_09) b 
LTDebt 尸二? 0.0102 0.0644 0.0597 0.0618 0.0618 0:0617 nn 讚懷《 
^ ^ iimsi__[6211a (5.48^  a 口 （5.47、n 0.0620(5.50) a 
i Business Segments ：® ^ ^^ ,—0/198 -0.0178 -0.0055 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 .002(0 45^  
No Dividend -0.0070 -0.0079 -0.0048 -0.0055 -0.0142 -0.0142 ： 二 、 _ … … 
Number of observations 1970 1970 1970 2581 1940 1940 1940 1940 
R-squared (% ) 《95% 4.72% 5.49% 8.51% 10.60% 10.60% 10.64% 10.66% 
i 81 
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Table 8 (I) (1). Panel All. Nine Eastern Asian countries (including Japan) 
Univariate results and multivariate results of cross-country tests for nine Asian countries 
Dependent Variable; Company Real Estate Holdings (PPE/TA) 
Cash Flow Rights to Control -0.0093 -0.0126 
Rights Ratio (CF/CR) (-1.53) (-1.50) 
-0.0724 0.2584 ^00788 -0.1480 
Herfindahl Index (-0.56) (3.93) a (-0.60) (-1.05) 
« 0.3870 0.3807 0.3213 
Balance Index ( 2 ^ (2.86) a (2.32) b 
-0.0039 -0.0023 
一 m.ds (-0.25) (-0.14) 
The Largest Shareholder's Cash -0.0009 
Flow stake (-1.08) 
The Largest Shareholder's 0.0028 
Control Rights (3.36) a 
n , , -0.0028 0.0028 
Dual-Class Structure (-1.49) (1.49) 
“ ‘ 0.0143 0.0036~ 0.0069 
Management Qi^ (0.34) (0.65) 
“ rT7 “ -0.0153 -0.0154 -0.0148 
Managerial Ownership (,i.67) (-1.66) (-1.57) 
“ ~ “ -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0010 
Board Composifon (-2.03) c (-2.00) e (-1.98) c 
& = 二二 ts 
. „ ^  , -0.0061~ -0.0061 Law & Order ^ (-0.84) 
Regulation dropped dropped 
T T T 0 . 0 1 4 5 0.0134 
Ant 卜 director 攀 ^ (1.21) 
I r - 0 . 0 0 2 6 -0.0007 
Accounting Standards ^ (-0.51) 
SizeofGovernn^ent ^ 
"“ “ “ -0.0128 -0.0023 
C o r — o n (-2.28)b 
l i 0 . 0 0 4 7 0.0189 
Starting a New Business (3.66) a 
Time with Government 0.0344 0.0052 
Bureaucracy (1.86) c (1.82) c 
. -0.0038 -0.0030 
Risk of Expropriation (-2.95) a (-2.31) b 
„ „ -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
hree LasniMow (-0.16) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.26) 
-0.0292 -0.0251 -0.0250 -0.0228 -0.0224 -0.0260 -0.0232 
Ln 侧 s (-9.80) a (-7.98) a (-8.01) a (-7.94) a (-6.43) a (-8.01) a (-6.53) a 
~ -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0005 
(•0.20) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.36) (-0.63) (-0.23) (-0.51) 
“ 0.6773 0.6685 0.6682 d?7m o l ^ 0?70^ 
L I 膽 t (18.33) a (18.18) a (18.18) a (18.19) a (18.24) a (17.88) a (17.94) a 
~ “ “ -0.0016 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0006 ^00019 00007 -0.0006 
好"smcss segments (-0.52) (0.37) (0.31) (-0.14) (-0.62) (0.22) (-0.20) 
-0.0247 -0.0203 -0.0203 -0.0221 -0.0152 -0.0222 -0.0166 
NO Uividena (-2.13) b (-1.75) b (-1.75) c (-1.90) c (-1.24) (-1.90) c (-1.34) 
Number of observations 1708 1708 1708 1708 1635 1678 1605 
R-squared (%) 18.66% 19.71% 19.29% 19.90% 20.52% 19.61% 20.79% 
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Table 8 (I) (1). Panel All. Nine Eastern Asian countries (including Japan) 
Univariate results and multivariate results of cross-country tests for nine Asian countries 
Corporate Governance, 
Public Governance, and Dependent Variable : Company Real Estate Holdings (PPE/TA) 
Relevant Control Variables 
Cash Flow Rights to Control Rights - 0 . 0 0 9 3 - 0 . 0 1 2 6 
Ratio (CF/CR) (-1.53) d (-1.50) 
u r. Ho»,i -0.0788 -0.1480 
Herfindahl Index (-0.60) (-1.05) 
~ ~ 7 ~ r " 0.3807 0.3213 臉 e—x (2.86) a (2.32) b 
„ .. -0.0039 -0.0023 
Py^ mids (-0.25) (-0.14) 
The Largest Shareholder's Cash 
Flow stake 
The Largest Shareholder's Control 
Rights 
D u a l — _ ^ ^ 
u • u- -0.0154 -0.0148 
Managerial Ownership (-1.66) (-1.57) 
“ ~ “ -0.0017 -0.0010 
Board Composmon (-2.00) e (-1.98) c 
Legal System -0.0097 . . , . 
& P r 二 Rights (-2.47) b dropped dropped 
1 t -0.0061 -0.0061 
— Order ^ (-0.84) 
Regulation dropped dropped 
7 7 7 - , D- Mo 0.0145 0.0134 
Anti-director Rights ^ (1.21) 
‘ ： . . -0.0057 -0.0026 -0.0007 
Accounting Standards (_5.lO)a (-0.51) 
“ ~ ~ “ -0.0194 
Size of Government (-149) ( 福 ） 
“ ；. -0.0128 -0.0023 
Co 订 uption (-2.80) a (-2.28)b 
“~： “ ~ r ~ 0.0183 0.0047 00189 
Starting a New Business ( 6 ^ Q j i ^ (3.66) a 
Time with Government Bureaucracy ^ ^ g s ^ f c 
, r~ -0.0038 -0.0030 
RiskofExpropnanon (-2.31) b 
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
Free Cash How (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.26) 
-0.0228 -0.0242 -0.0228 -0.0315 -0.0224 -0.0260 -0.0232 
^ ^ (-7.37) a (-7.86) a (-7.37) a (-10.08) a (-6.43) a (-8.01) a (-6.53) a 
~ -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 ； - 0 . 0 0 0 6 -0.0002 -0.0005 
(-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.38) (-0.15) (-0.63) (-0.23) (-0.51) 
0.6928 0.6685 0.6928 0.6927 0.7083 0.6683 0 ? ^ 
LI 匪 (18.95) a (18.79) a (18.95) a (18.51) a (18.24) a (17.88) a (17.94) a 
~ ~ “ -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0007 -0.0006 
"usiness segments (-0.14) (0.22) (-0.14) (-0.46) (-0.62) (0.22) (-0.20) 
-0.0156 ^oioT^ ^ o i o ^ ^^omsi ^ o o m ^ o x i T ^ ^ 
NO uiviaena (-1.35) b (-1.06) (-1.35) (-1.93) b (-1.24) (-1.90) c (-1.34) 
Number of observations 1708 1708 1708 1708 1635 1678 1605 
R-squared (%) 20.64% 20^2% 20.64% 18.85% 2032% 19.61% 20.79% 
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Table 8 (II). Panel All. Nine Eastern Asian countries (including Japan) 
Regressing real estate holdings on corporate governance and public governance 
for the firms from 8 Asian countries included in the Panel A. 
In this table, we import three indexes Anti-director Index, Rule of Law, and Disclosure 
which are given in "Law and Finance, La Porta et al. (1998)" as the measurements of 
public governance of each country. 
Corporate Governance, 
Public Governance, and Dependent Variable : Company Real Estate Holdings (PPE/TA) 
Relevant Control Variables 
Cash Flow Rights to Control - 0 . 0 0 9 3 ~ - 0 . 0 0 7 5 ~ 
Rights Ratio (CF/CR) (-1.55) (-1.80) c 
„ ^ . . , , . 0.2584 -0.0788 -0.1121~~ 
Herfindahl Index (-0.60) (-0.81) 
Balance Index ^ ； ^ 
(4.90) a (2.86) a (2.56) a 
p、們n j^Hc -0.0039 -0 .0030~ 
Pyramids (-0.25) (-0.19) 
^ , , “ ； 0.0064 -0.0028 0.0024 
Dual-class Stnicture ^ (-0.27) (1.51) 
u , 0.0143 0.0036 0.0029 
Management ^ (0.34) (0.27) 
^ .. .. , , , 0.0213 0.0172 
Anti-director Index ( 2 ^ (1.96) b 
~ “ -0.0035 -0.00002 臉 of Law ^ (-0.05) c 
, -0.0042 -0.0032 
Disclosure (-2.35) 
「 h P l -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
阳 e ^^asn M O W (-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.27) 
-0.0292 -0.0287 -0.0248 -0.0250 -0.0249 -0.0260 - 0 . 0 2 4 3 ~ 
(-9.80) a (-9.33) a (-8.01) a (-7.94) a (-7.25) a (-8.01) a (-6.93) a 
~ -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0 .0003~ 
(-0.20) (-0.22) (-0.43) (-0.36) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.30) 
0.6773 0.6759 O l m 0.6700 0.6999 0.6683 0.6957 
(18.33) a (18.25) a (18.18) a (18.19) a (18.05) a (17.88) a (17.75) a 
~ “ “ -0.0016 ^ O M S O M O ^ O ^ -0.0025 0.0007 -0 .0008~ 
Business ^ egmenis (-0.52) (-0.44) (0.31) (-0.13) (-0.83) (0.22) (-0.27) 
-0.0247 -0.0256 -0.0203 -0.0221 -0.0093 -0.0222 -0.0108 
NO mviaena (-2.13) b (-2.20) b (-1.75) c (-1.90) c (-0.76) (-1.90) c (-0.87) 
Number of observations 1708 1708 1708 1708 1635 1678 1605 
R-squared (%) 18.66% 18.58% 19.69% 19.29% 19.57% 19.61% 20.13% 
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Table 9. Panel B. Regressing PPE/TA and Average PPE/TA on explanatory variables 
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
98 PPE/TA Average PPE/TA 
Anti-director 0.0235 0.0227 0.0237 0.0098 0.0344 
Index (10.34) a (8.07) a (7.90) a (4.32) a (3.20) a 
P , f , ^ ^ -0.0080 -0.0069 0.0207 -0.0039 0.0134 
Kuieor Law (-4.95) a (-3.43) a (4.89) a (-2.98) a (3.15) a 
Disclosure 0.0013 0.00014 0.0014 0.0021 -0.0002 
(3.49) a (0.27) (2.59) a (3.12) a (1.94) c 
C。 ;T i on -0.0172 -0.0201 
Index (-4.71)3 (-4.11) a 
^ Mska : 0 0334 -0.0289 
H .85 )a (-3.78) a 
Efficiency of 0 0017 
Judicial -0.0008 
System (—U. 乂） (-1.29) 
Free Cash 0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 0.0013 0.0074 0.0009 0.0068 
Flow (0.75) (0.51) (0.71) (1.28) (0.73) (1.23) (1.00) 
0.0028 0.0033 0.0039 0.0035 0.0034 0.0038 0.0042 
Ln bales (2.07) b (2.45) b (2.81) a (2.35) b (2.45) b (2.41) b (2.38) b 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.000024 -0.000026 -0.000023 -0.00002 
^ ^ (-1.57) (-1.54) (-1.84) c (-1.60) (-1.68) c (-1.55) (-1.66) c 
0.1133 0.1187 0.1140 0.0808 0.1107 0.0799 0.1099 
L l U e W (12.89) a (13.42) a (12.80) a (9.12) a (12.62) a (9.08) a (11.09) a 
Business -0.0024 -0.0060 -0.0063 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0020 
Segments (-1.17) (-2.88) a (-2.98) a (-0.65) (-0.59) (-1.11) (-1.97) b 
. 0.0270 0.0214 0.0192 0.0111 0.0217 0.0095 0.0184 
No Uivideno (3 54) a (2.87) a (2.54) a (1.25) (2.88) a (1.32) (2.01) a 
Number of 6053 6053 6057 5868 5868 5789 5789 
observations 
R-squared (%) 5.16% 3.88% 4.09% 5.42% 6.36% 5.60% 6.55% 
I I 1 I I U I 
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Table 10. Regression of 1998 PPE(net)/TA-Split into ‘ITU，and ‘SO，- Panel A Sample 
Industrial-Transportation-Utility Services & Other 
Sample Size 2653 932 
Free Cash flow 
0.0025 (1.57) 0.0009 (1.05) 
Size (Ln Sales) -0.0102 (-2.60) a -0.0033 (-1.99) b 
(Growth Opportunities) -0.000028 (-1.96) b -0.000021 (-2.00) b 
LTDebt 0.1088 (9.97) a 0.0982 (7.07) a 
Business Segments -0.0078 (-2.28) b -0.0008 (-0.98) 
No dividend 
-0.0108 (-1.07) -0.0200 (-0.20) 
" g ： ： ： ： ： ^ 指 ） e 棚5(捕） 
Herfinhahl Index 0.0524(1.51) 0.0427(1.01) 
Balance Index 0.0200 (1.49) -0.1075 (-0.53) 
Pyramids 0.0237 (1.62) 0.0341 (1.43) 
Dual Class Structure 0.0556 (2.99) a 0.0481 (2.60) a 
Management (Duality) 0.0017(1.31) -0.0002 (0.74) 
Managerial Ownership -0.0205 (-2.05) a -0.0455 (-3.09) a 
Board Composition -0.0021 (-2.64) a 0.0200(1.31) 
Observations 1166 381 
R-squared 4.40% 4.27% 
Free Cash flow is operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends and common 
dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value to book value. Business segment is the number of 
segments reported by Wworldscope dataset. LT Debt is long term debt normalized by total assets. No Dividend dummy equals 1 if the 
firm paid no dividend in year 1997 and is 0 otherwise. Corporate Governance measures are Cash Flow Rights to Control Rights ratio, 
Herfindahl Index, Balance Index, Pyramids dummy, Dual Class Structure dummy, Duality, Managerial Ownership, and Board 
Composition (outside director). Number in ( ) is T-statistics. ‘a’，'b', 'c' and 'd' indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
and 15% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Interaction Effect between corporate governance variables and 
public governance variables. 
Interaction term Regression Results 
Estimated 
Corporate Governance Public Governance coefficient and 丁 . . 
variables variables Robust Standard 1—statistics 
Error 
Managerial Legal System & -0.0211 1 仙 
Ownership Property Rights (0.018) 
^ J ^ 、. Legal System & -0.0078 i 
Board Composition Rights (0.003) • 
0 1342 
Herfindahl Index Anti-director Rights (0 011) 1.91c 
Board Composition Corruption (0 018) -1-39 
“ . , R i s k of 0.0048 ^ 
Cross-holdings Expropriation (0.002) 
The dependent variable is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both in net value. 
Dependent variables are Free Cash Flow, Ln Sales, M/B, LT Debt, Business Segments, No Dividend 
dummy, corporate governance variables, public governance variables and a certain "interaction term". 
When we check the interaction effect between a certain corporate governance variable (such as Managerial 
Ownership) and a public governance measure (such as Legal System & Property Rights), we firstly obtain 
the "interaction term" according to the procedures as follows: Firstly, we calculate the median of Legal 
System & Property Rights index, and then define a new term which is equal to 1 for those countries whose 
value of Legal System & Property Rights is larger than the median and is 0 otherwise. Secondly, we 
multiply this new term with the corporate governance measure (Managerial Ownership) if their influences 
on real estate holdings have the same directions as predicted. Next, we regress this “Interaction term" 
together with other governance variables as well as control variables on real estate holdings. Finally, we 
will check the Interaction Effects according to the estimated coefficients and their T-statistics of the 
"Interaction terms". 
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Appendix 1. Regression results (multivariate results) for several great nations: 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, and Southern 
American countries 
Dependent Variable： PPE/TA U . K . F r a n c e Germany ^ o n g J a p a n A u s t r a l i a S o u t h e r n 
Kong r America 
Cash Flow Rights to Control Rights -0.0333 -0.0107 
Ratio (CF/CR) (-1.84) c (-1.58) 
rTTTTrr^ 0.0557 0.0334 
Herfmdahl Index (1.60) (1.44) 
~ 0 . 0 1 3 2 0.0008 
B — c e Index (0.19) (0.01) 
” T h e Largest Shareholder's C a s h ~ 
Flow Rights 1 
The Largest Shareholder's Control 
Rights 
„ . . 0.0555 0.0170 0.0091 
Pyramids (2.66) a (1.54) (1.51) 
Cross-holdings 
D — s s S _ u r e — 
Controlling Alone 
“ ； -0.0028 0.0004 
Management (-0.34) (0.05) 
"“ r r i “ -0.0153 -0.0147 
Managerial Ownership (-1.85) c (-1.63) c 
； ; ~ “ -0.0022 -0.0012 
Board Composition (-2.11) b (-2.00) b 
„ „ . P, 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0010 0.0008 0.0011 
hree " s n MOW (1.03) (1.02) (1.24) (1.00) (0.79) (1.10) 
0.0020 -0.0003 0.0040 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0050 
L " 浏 es (1.35) (-0.22) (2.74) a (0.37) (0.58) (-2.44) b 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00002-0.00002 -0.00002 
(-1.88) c (-1.01) (-2.00) b (-1.59) (-1.65) c (-1.62) c 
0.0830 0.0891 0.0799 0.1046 o l ^ 0.0927 
LI 讓 (9.38) a (10.04)a (8.99)a (10.11) a (9.95) a (9.06)a 
“ “ -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0043 -0.0076 -0.0086 -0.0030 
Business Segments (-1.61) (-1.10) (-1.81) c (-2.99) a (-3.35) a (-1.13) 
0.0122 0.0007 0.0121 ^00025 -0.0036 
No Dividend (1.40) (0.08) (1.37) (-0.27) (-0.55) (-0.38) 
Number of observations 4332 4332 4216 3678 3632 3545 
R-squared (%) 4.84% 4.22% 4.10% 3.45% 4.36% 8.26% 
1 in order to avoid collinearity, we do not include Herfindahl Index, Balance Index, The Largest 
Shareholder's Cash Flow Rights, and The Largest Shareholder's Control Rights in an objective function at 
one time. The estimated coefficients of these variables presented here are their univariate results but not 
multivariate results. 
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Appendix 2. Summary statistics - Germany 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA of Germany 
Mean S.D. Max Min Observations 
1998 p p g ^ ^ 0.269 0.207 0.981 0 607 
Free Cash Flow 0.437 1.345 12.67 -10.737 517 
M/B 2.501 13.019 35.245 -231.027 461 
No Dividend 0.370 0.483 1 0 492 
q^qqI^  3,083,573 8,877,314 127,504,753 0 606 
Ln Sales 13.064 2.147 5.264 18.050 598 
LT DEBT 2,551,451 13,142,433 154,388,000 0 607 
Level of Debt 0.096 0.114 0.689 0 602 
—Herfindahl Index 0.382 0.328~ 1 0 508 
'Balance Index' 0.469 7.591 0.150 0 508 
CF/CR 0.850 0.258 1 0.0026 508 
Pyramids 0.219 0.414 1 0 508 
Cross Holdings 0.028 0.164 1 0 508 
Multiple Chains 0.077 0.266 1 0 508 
Dual-Class 0.175 0.381 1 0 508 
Controlling owner alone 0.638 0.481 1 0 508 
Management 0.653 0.478 1 0 150 
I 
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Appendix 3. Correlation between independent variables 
which explain 1998 Real estate holdings of firms in Germany 
J^ re^  Ln Le:el Herfindahl Balance 
Cash e , M/B of , t」 t」 




Ln Sales 0.172 1 
M/B 0.611 0.069 1 
Level of Debt 0.029 0.178 -0.016 1 
No Dividend -0.158 -0.287 -0.166 0.182 1 
Herfindahl o.092 -0.324 -0.022 -0.095 0.082 1 
Index 
Balance Index -0.041 -0.090 0.007 -0.029 0.111 -0.184 1 
Pyramids -0.053 -0.105 0.023 0.115 0.020 -0.083 0.117 
Dual-Class 0.150 0.299 0.077 0.027 -0.309 -0.430 0.027 
’ ItjPle 0.136 -0.071 0.022 0.166 -0.069 0.064 -0.094 
Chains 
Controlling o.082 0.054 0.140 -0.141 -0.023 0.247 -0.402 
alone 
Cash Flow 
Rights/ 0.099 -0.208 -0.054 -0.075 0.184 0.502 -0.063 
Control Rights ^ 
Mnagement -0.015 -0.185 -0.069 0.169 0.083 -0.043 -0.198 
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Appendix 4. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Germany (1) 
—Univariate Results (i) 
• Hypothesized correlation between Management and Net PPE/TA level is statistically significant 
Explanatory Coefficient & ‘ , ^ , • „ ^ ,. 
Variables (Robust Sd. Error) t-mtio P>|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow 2.05 a 0.043 + 
Siii ^ ^ ^ 
(Ln Sales) (0.009) ^ ^ ？ 
腦 m o m -1.62 b 0.109 -
Level of Debt ( 二 ^ 3.29 a 0.001 ] 
Business Segments (0 039) 1-08 0.282 + 
0 092 
No Dividend (f “工 2.37 a 0.020 -
Management (0 025) 2.05 a 0.043 + 
f No. of 
ML 110 effective 109 
Observations Observations 
R-sq. 0.237 Adjusted 0.192 
1 R-sq. 
F-Statistics 5.32 Prob>F 0.0001 
1 Here the numbers in ( ) are the Standard Deviation values of all the explanatory variables 
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Appendix 5. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Germany (2) 
—Management (ii) 
• Hypothesized correlation between Management and Net PPE/TA level is statistically significant 
Coefficient & 
w (Robust Sd. t-ratio P>|t| Expected sign 
VBTiables 厂 、 
Error) 
Free Cash Flow (》益•) 2.17 a 0.033 + 
,/ize 0.008 0.83 0.407 , 
(Ln Sales) (0.009) ？ 
— ( = 1 ) -1.65 b 0.102 -
Level of Debt ( 冗 & 3.04 a 0.003 ^ 
No Dividend (》=) 1.22 0.224 -
Controlling alone (0 038) -0-50 0.620 -
CF/CR 二 - 0 . 8 7 0.389 + 
Management (0 039) 2.45 a 0.016 -
No. of 108 No. of effective 
Observations Observations 
R-sq. 0.2435 Adjusted R-sq. 0.1836 
F-statistics 4.06 Prob>F 0.0003 
92 
Appendix 6. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - GermanyQ) 
—Univariate Results (iii) 
• Hypothesized correlations of Net PPE/TA level with Cross-holdings, Dual-Class structure, and 
Holdings through multiple chains are statistically significant 
Explanatory Variables (Robus^Sd^E^o^ t-ratio P>|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow -0.17 0.869 + 
Size -0.007 
(Ln Sales) (0.005) u.iys ？ 
励 g:0009) -0.02 0.981 -
0 522 
Level of Debt 5.94 a 0.000 ^ 
No Dividend 0.07 0.940 -
Pyramids 二芸) -0.61 0.542 + 
Cross holdings -0.172 -2.54 0.011 + 
Dual-Class structure (0 028) -1-44 0.151 + 
_ Q Q ' Y G 
Control through multiple chains (0 041) -1.93 c 0.055 + 
No. of IIQ No. of effective ⑴卩 
Observations Observations 
R-sq. 0.2435 Adjusted R-sq. 0.1836 
F-statistics 4.06 Prob>F 0.0003 
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Appendix 7. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Germanv(4) 
—Firm-level univariate results as well as multivariate results 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) Expected sign 
0.053 -0.154 -0.122 
Herfmdahl Index (丄^石广 (.i.72)c (1.61) + 
„ , T ^  -0.000015 0.018 
Balance Index ^ ^ 
rR「R 0.196 
C 戲 ^ -
„ . , -0.016 
P y r — ^ + 
Multiple Control Chains + 
„ , 0.119 
Dual-Class ^ + 
^ ... 1 0.005 -0.007 
Controlling owner alone ( • ⑶ （0 15) + 
: “ 0.083 
Management (2 i4)b + 
“ T T Z -0.0048 0.060 0.046 
Free Cash Flow (.0.46) (2.38)b (1.61) + 
-0.0072 -0.0024 0.0003 
Ln、aies (-1.33) (0.25) (0.03) ？ 
0.00012 -0.003 0.003 
(0.14) (-1.85) (0.45) -
0.517 0.544 0.598 
Level of Debt (5.79)a^ (3.25)a (3.48)a ？ 
0.016 0.042 0.048 
No Dividend (0.67) (1.08) (1.17) 
〜No. of 323 110 110 
Observations 
R-sq. 0.129 0.260 0.300 
F-statistic 6.67 2.81 3.15 
1 Here the numbers in ( ) are the t-statistics in each regression. 
"The correlation of Net PPE/TA with Herfindahl Index as well as Balance Index is more significant if we 
conduct the univariate regression, and some of the univariate results are omitted here. 
2 ‘a’，'b', and ‘c’ indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 8. Summary statistics - France 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA of France 
Mean S.D. Max Min Observations 
1998 0.232 0.235 0.978 0 623 
Free Cash Flow 0.329 6.585 64.167 -110.73 461 
M/B 2.582 10.156 213.440 -4.300 86 
^ ^ 5 i ^^ 
Segments 
No Dividend 0.172 0.380 1 0 478 
(glS) 2,355,018 3,801,667 74,020,041 -1,453 611 
Ln Sales 12.438 2.295 18.120 2.191 608 
LT DEBT 5,568,445 24,146,857 338,478,000 0 612 
Level of Debt 10.473 255.331 6306.333 0 610 
Herfindahl Index 0.349 0.262 1 0.004 479 
‘Balance Index’ 0.042 0.130 0.978 0 479 
CF/CR 0.963 0.126 1 0.148 475 
Pyramids 0.164 0.371 1 0 476 
Dual-Class 0.015 0.121 1 0 476 
Controlling owner alone 0.627 0.484 20 4.411 476 
Largest Shareholder's 
Cash Flow Stake 叫 u.zz/ i 4 0 
largest S h a r e h o l d e r ' s ^ ~ ； ^ ^ 
Control Stake 
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Appendix 9. Correlation between independent variables 
which explain 1998 Real estate holdings of firms in France 
广 L n H/D ^o Herfindahl Balance 
Cash „ , M/B of t^ n..」 」 t」 t」 




Ln Sales 0.041 1 
M/B 0.025 0.031 1 
Level of Debt 0.114 -0.02 -0.049 1 
No Dividend 0.169 -0.16 0.088 0.252 1 
Herfindahl _o.o04 0.014 0.018 0.040 0.057 1 
Index 
Balance Index 0.054 -0.05 -0.023 -0.026 -0.053 -0.138 1 
Pyramids -0.036 0.046 -0.019 -0.041 -0.068 0.006 0.024 
Multiple Chains 0.066 -0.06 -0.020 0.047 0.157 -0.055 0.040 
Dual-Class -0.023 0.166 -0.005 0.006 -0.030 -0.091 -0.049 
Cash Flow 
Rights/ 0.003 -0.12 0.015 -0.046 -0.040 0.303 -0.149 
Control Rights 
Controlling _o.o75 0.229 -0.080 -0.011 -0.054 0.343 -0.408 
owner alone 
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Appendix 10. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - France 
—Firm-level univariate results as well as multivariate results 
參 Hypothesized correlation between 'Level of Debt' and Net PPE/TA is very significant 
E 二 r (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) E ; t e d 
0.022 0.030 0.045 0.039 
Herfindahl Index (0 49)2 (0.61) (0.85) (0.84) + 
„ , . , 0.052 0.048 
她 n e e Index (0.55) (0.56) _ 
CF/CR (-0^ 8) “ 
. 0.006 0.00013 0.004 
Pyamias (0.20) (0.0001) (0.13) + 
Multiple Control 0.036 
Chains (0.62) + 
Dual-Class + 
Controlling owner 0.004 
alone (0.15) 
, -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Free Cash Mow (.0.42) (-0.33) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.54) + 
^ -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
(Ln Sales) (-1.10) (-1.04) (-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.40) ？ 
~ 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
醒 (0.47) (0.53) (0.45) (0.51) (0.47) -
‘ 0 . 2 6 1 0.251 0.235 0.233 0.235 
Level ot Debt (3.97)a* (3.89)a (3.58)a (3.52)a (3.57)a ？ 
-0.028 -0.034 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 
No Dividend (五 口） (.1,42) (-0.46) (-0.57) (-0.52) ‘ 
300 298 250 250 250 
Observations 
R-sq. 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.061 0.058 
F-statistic 2.89 2.81 2.82 1.29 1.47 
2 Here the numbers in ( ) are T-statistics. 
"‘a，，‘b，’ ‘c’ and indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 11. Summary statistics - Belgium 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA of Belgium 
^ 
Mean S.D. Max Min 么 “ " 儿 , 〕 
percentile percentile percentile 
1QQ8 
p p ^ ^ 0.198 0.209 0.985 0 0.012 0.129 0.348 
„ p Kci 0.279 0.181 0.95 -0.13 0.16 0.257 0.391 
Free Cash Flow 
_ 2.685 3.433 18.892 -5.438 1.205 1.677 2.713 
Business 3.525 1.557 5 1 , 
Segments 2 4 5 
、T T .^ ^ 0.256 0.438 1 0 0 . , N o Dividend 0 1 
Sales 1,309,276 2,505,938 13,506.593 14 40199 227,453 1203182 
(000$) 
, „ , 11.792 2.585 16.419 4.913 10.29742 12.232 13.596 
Ln Sales 
LTDEBT 43，789，391 157,859,285 1,051,018,931 ^ 148,689 1,371,301 10,208,012 
Level of Debt 0.125 0.117 0.51 0 ••027 o.093 0.181 
CF/CR 0.856 0.253 1 0.059 0.70165 1 1 
0 252 0 4 3 7 
Pyramids u.—)/ 1 0 0 0 0.5 
Dual-Class 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 w n = 2 0 % Control 20 0 20 20 20 20 20 
LS Cash Flow 25.684 94.980 0 10.6325 35 52 
L S Control 39-369 25.809 940980 0 25.03 43 55.94 
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Appendix 12. Correlation between independent variables 
which explain 1998 real estate holdings - Belgium 
Free „ • Level of 、t 〜 .」 j 
^ , B u s i n e s s . _ , ^^  , ^  No Dividend 




M/B 0.035 1 
pusmess q.OVS -0.094 1 
Segments 
, e , 0.431 -0.080 0.327 1 
Ln Sales 
巧 e^ of -0.072 0.087 -0.062 -0.002 1 
Debt 
No Dividend -0.283 -0.262 0.106 -0.158 0.218 1 
0.121 -0.031 0.193 0.194 -0.139 -0.164 1 
C r / C K 
、， ,-0.060 -0.132 0.204 0.006 0.192 -0.195 0.065 
Management 
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Appendix 13. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Belgium (i) 
Multivariate results when containing all the explanatory variables 
Explanatory Variables (Rotold.^E^or) t-ratio P>|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow (”品 0.31 0.756 + 
Siii ^ 0 002 
(Ln Sales) (0.001) J.” u 观 ？ 
-0 004 
M/B (0.006) -0.71 0.480 _ 
Level of Debt (0.161) 5.17 0.000 ？ 
Business Segments (g llg) 0.78 0.438 + 
Herfindahl Index (g.g^l 0.06 0.951 + 
-0 034 
Pyramids 0.600 0.550 + 
Holdings though -0 035 + 
Multiple Chains (0.153) 
No. of No. of effective ^^ 
Observations Observations 
R-sq. 0.563 Adjusted R-sq. 0.467 
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Appendix 14. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Belgium (ii) 
Management is statistically very significant 
Explanatory Coefficient & ‘ „ u , , . 
Variables (Robust Sd. E r r o r ) � 袖 。 P>|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow 二& 1.32 0.191 + 
Size -0.025 0 007 
(Ln Sales) (0.009) 」〕 ？ 
0.007 noin 
M/B (0.005 1-26 0.210 — 
T , .T^  U. 4.71 0.000 。 Level of Debt (0.162) ？ 
Management (0 042) 3.34 0.001 + 
M f No. of 〜 嫩 。 92 effective 85 
Observations , 
Observations 
R-sq. 0.424 Adjusted R- 0.383 
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Appendix 15. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Belgium (iii) 
The discrepancy between ownership and control in Belgium is abnormally insignificant 
Iterms and Coefficient & ^ „ r, „ , , . 
Variables (Robust Sd. Error) t-mtio P>|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow (0 ifv) 1-38 0.170 + 
(LnsLs) (aOlO) 2.87 0.005 ？ 
0-004 0 71 0 480 
M/B (0.005) u./i U.45U _ 
Level of Debt (0.171) 5.13 0.000 ？ 
Business Segments (0 M3) 1-47 0.144 + 
f No. of 
。L~o_of 91 effective 84 
Observations Observations 
R-sq. 0.344 Adjusted o.297 
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Appendix 16. Summary statistics - Finland 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA of Finland 
Mean S.D. Max Min Observations 
1998 0.363 0.229 0.927 0 103 
PPE/TA 
„ ^ , „ 0.084 1.233 0.82 -11.73 96 
Free Cash Flow 
1.584 2.556 11.999 -14.878 86 
M/B 
Business 3.455 1.487 5 1 103 
Segments 
、T .. . 0.172 0.380 1 0 87 
No Dividend 
Sales 1,023,175 1,804,530 9,660,615 103 
(000$) 
T „ 1 12.488 1.907 16.084 7.766 103 
Ln Sales 
LTDEBT 43.789,391 157,859,285 1,051,018,931 0 
Level of Debt 0.226 0.264 2.129 0 103 
0 14S4 
„ ^ . , , . 1876 1 0.0001 37 
Herfindahl Index 
CF/CR 1 隱 1 Q 39 
„ 0.061 0.242 1 0 39 
Pyramids 
Dual-Class 0.422 0.498 0 0 
1 c 0 0 7 
Own=20%Control 。••^ 。‘ 5.700 20 4.411 65 
Largest Shareholder's 0.345 0.257 0.950 0.012 39 
Cash Flow Stake 
Largest Shareholder's 0.393 0.258 0.941 0.093 39 
Control Stake 
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Appendix 17. Correlation between independent variables 
which explain 1998 Real estate holdings of firms in Finland 
Free 
r h lU/R Business Ln Level of No 




羅 • _ ^ 
Business o.36 0.11 1 
Segments 
Ln Sales 0.37 0.05 0.64 1 
Level of Debt -0.34 -0.33 -0.10 -0.05 1 
No Dividend -0.46 -0.3 -0.26 -0.37 0.37 1 
Pyramids 0.25 0.19 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.09 1 
Dual-Class 0.11 0.11 -0.26 -0.27 -0.32 0.20 -0.21 
Controlling owner _〇 13 .0.16 -0.07 -0.005 0.49 0.60 0.16 
alone 
CF/CR -0.15 0.006 0.02 0.005 -0.05 0.12 -0.35 
0wn=20%ctr 0.04 0.2 -0.37 -0.14 0.06 0.12 -0.07 
ci^  气 e s t 0.23 0.08 0.40 0.30 0.08 0.16 0.08 
Shareholder s CF 
『！ r^ D 0.23 0.06 0.43 0.29 0.11 0.15 0.30 
Shareholder s CR 
Shareholders' • 0.23 0.30 0.08 0.03 -0.20 -0.16 
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Appendix 18. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Finland (1) 
—Univariate Results ( i ) 
• Hypothesized correlation between Herfindahl Index and Net PPE/TA level is statistically significant 
Explanatory Coefficient & ！ ^ , • “ ~ 
Variables (Robust Sd. Error) t-mtio P〉|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow 1.49 0.140 + 
(Ln Sales) (0.014) ^ ^ ？ 
励 m m -0.19 0.851 _ 
Level of Debt (0：178) 4.84 0.091 ？ 
Business Segments (0^ 0^ 99) -1.71 0.000 + 
No Dividend (二益 -1.81 0.075 -
0 4488 
Herfindahl Index {0\53) 2.92 0.005 + 
M f No. of 
^^ ：. 77 effective 69 
Observations .. 
Observations 
R - s q . 0.344 0.278 
F(7,69) 5.18 Prob>F 0.0001 
105 
Appendix 19. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Finland (2) 
• Results (ii) 
• Hypothesized correlation between the 'separation' of largest shareholder's cash flow rights 
and Net PPE/TA level is also statistically significant 
Explanatory Coefficient & „ ,, ” ，. 
Variables (Robust Sd. Error) t-mtio P>|t| Expected sign 
0 253 
Free Cash Flow ( 二 1 . 2 7 0.213 + 
(Ln Sales) (0.0185) 棚 Q-956 ? 
M/B -0.56 0.578 _ 
Business Segments (0 026) -2.35 0.024 ？ 
Level of Debt (^巧尝） 4.09 0.000 + 
-0 049 
No Dividend (二工 -0.51 0.616 -
Controlling owner ^ ^ + 
alone (0.087) 
Largest 
Shareholder's Cash 0.005 
Flow stake/ (0.0018) "^力“ 则。^ + 
Second one's 
Management [冗^ -0.90 0.373 + 
No of No. of 
• . 47 effective 46 
Observations . 
Observations 
~ 0.482 Adjusted R- ^ 
1 sq. 
F statistic 3.82 Prob>F 0.0017 
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Appendix 20. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Finland (3) 
• Results (iii) 
• Hypothesized correlation between the 'separation' of largest shareholders' cash flow rights 
and Net PPE/TA level is also statistically significant 
Explanatory Coefficient & “ ！ ["Ti I 
Variables (Robust Sd. Error) t-ratio P〉|t| Expected sign 
Free Cash Flow (g.^g) 1.97 0.057 + 
(Ln Sales) (0.019) ^ ^ ？ 
— ( o S ) -0.72 0.479 — 
Business Segments (0^0262) -1-72 0.094 ？ 
0 83(1 
Level of Debt ( ^ ^。 3.88 0.000 + 
No Dividend 0.49 0.629 -
Cash Flow Rights/ 0500 ~ ~ “ 
Control Rights (0.083) 
Management (^ /： )^ -1.22 0.231 + 
No of No. of 
〜 • ‘. 47 effective 46 
Observations 
Observations 
^ ^ A _ e d R - ^ ^ 
F statistic 3.82 Prob>F 0.0017 
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Appendix 21. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Finland (4) 
• Results (iv) 
• Hypothesized correlation between the 'Pyramids' and Net PPE/TA level is insignificant 
(Dual-class structure is also insignificant in the sample of Finland) 
Coefficient & 
Explanatory (Robust Sd. t-ratio P>|t| Expected sign 
Variables Eiror) 
Free Cash Flow 1.95 0.059 + 
Size -0.011 n rr n SRS 
(Ln Sales) (0.020) -0.55 0.585 ？ 
— (0.024) -0.59 0.560 _ 
Business -0.038 . ^ ^ 0184 
Segments (0.028) ？ 
Level of Debt 2.87 0.007 + 
No Dividend (g•二 j) 0.40 0.688 -
Pyramids ( 二 ） 0.38 0.708 + 
A , 肌 ot 47 effective 39 
Observations Observations 
^ ^ Adjusted R- ^ 
SCj^* 
F statistic 2.65 Prob>F 0.024 
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Appendix 22. Cross sectional data regression of Net PPE/TA - Finland (5) 
• Multivariate Results (v) 
• Hypothesized correlation between the 'Herfindahl index' and Net PPE/TA is very significant at 
the 5% significance level 
• Hypothesized correlation between the 'Cash Flow Rights/Control Rights' and Net PPE/TA is 
significant at the 15% significance level 
E、？lan5oryCoefficient & ； ： ； ； ； ； ； ~ ~ Expected sign 
Variables (Robust Sd. Error) ^ ^ 
fTviQ 
Free Cash Flow (g'g^ 1.65 0.107 + 
Si^ -0.0014 ~ ~ 
(Ln Sales) (0.0183) ？ 
讓 (0.022) -0.57 0.575 _ 
Business Segments (0 026) •2-41 0.021 ？ 
Level of Debt (》g々 ） 3.83 0.000 + 
No Dividend (_二4) -0.46 0.645 -
Herfindahl Index (g.fg) 2.42 0.021 
Pyramids 丨^ 0.87 0.389 + 
Cash Flow Rights/ 0.142 , ^^ 0 川 “ 
Control Rights (0.087) 十 
M f No. of 
n^^No.ot 47 effective 46 
Observations Observations 
^ 
F statistic 3.82 Prob>F 0.0017 
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